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THE RIGHTS OF PARENTALLY-PLACED PRIVATE
SCHOOL STUDENTS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
2004 AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Lewis M. Wasserman*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act ("IDEA/2004" or "the Act") 1 inequitably restricts the
educational rights of privately-schooled students with
disabilities relative to students enrolled in public schools. 2
* Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Leaders hip and Policy Studies,
Virginia Tech.; Ph.D. in psychology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York; J .D. ,
St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York. The author gratefully
acknowledges the helpful commentary and analysis of hi s law partner, Pamela L.
Steen, Esq. ,Wasserman Steen, LLP, Patchogue, New York, and the help of the
author's research assistant, Robert Falconi, B.A., Virginia Tech., in the preparation of
the manuscript.
1. IDEA/2004 was enacted as Public Law 108-446, and codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§1400- 1485. It contains subchapter 1- General Provisions, §§1400-1409; Subchapter
II-Assista nce for Education of All Children with Disabilities, §§ 1411- 1419;
Subchapter III- Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, §§ 1431-1444; and Subchapter
IV-National Activities to Improve Education for Children with Disabilities, §§ 14501482. IDEA/2004 is the most recent in a series of enactme nts beginning with the
Education of the Handicapped Act in 1970, 84 Stat. 175. The original act was amended
substantially in the Education for All H andicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EHA/75"),
89 Stat. 773, Pub.L. No. 94- 142, and again as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act of 1997 Pub. L. No. 105-15 111 Stat. 37 (1997). In 1990, EHA175 was
renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-1142.
These laws provided financia l support to state and local educational agencies for the
education of children with disabilities in the nation's public schools.
2. According to the most current statistics, about 76% of the private schools in
the United States are characterized as sectarian by the Department of Education,
OFFICE OF NON-PUBLIC EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF Eouc., STATISTICS ABOUT NON -PUBLIC
EDUCATION
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2005),
available
at
http://www. ed. gov/about/offices/list/oii/ nonpublic/ statistics.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2008). These entities enroll 82'Y., of elementary and secondary private school students.
Private sc hools represent about 23% of all the elementary and secondary schools in the
United States and enroll 10% of the United States eleme ntary and secondary
population. !d. The total private school enrollment in t he United States is
approxim ately 5,057,520 st udents. !d. This information came to the attention of the
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IDEA/2004 substantially limits the State's duty to furnish
special education services to privately-schooled students
compared to students enrolled in public programs. 3 Moreover,
this inequity extends to procedural fairness on such matters as
parental participation in the development of a child's
educational plan, access to administrative due process, and the
availability of judicial remedies for the failure of educational
agencies to design programs which meet the needs of these
disabled students or deliver promised services. 4 IDEA's goal of
serving all children with disabilities 5 is thus thwarted by
IDEA/2004 itself. 6 This article is a call for a Congressional
redressing of these inequities. In light of the recency of the
IDEA/2004 amendments, the likelihood of reform is uncertain.
A remedy may lie, however, in state legislatures, where
parents and advocates may receive a more sympathetic ear.
Part II-A of this article reviews IDEA/2004's core general
provisiOns, including eligibility criteria, Individualized
Educational Program ("IEP") development and content,
parental participation requirements, administrative due
process and judicial review, and agencies' child find obligations.
Part 11-B addresses IDEA's funding mechanism for publiclyenrolled versus privately-enrolled students and the limitations
under IDEA/2004 on privately-schooled students' rights to
services, including those delivered on-site and the agencies'
obligation to discuss services with both private school
representatives and parents. Part 11-C examines IDEA/2004's
a uthor in Ra lph D. Mawdsley and Alan Osborn, Providing Special Education Services
to Students in Religious Schools. 2 19 ED. LAW REP. 347, 348 (2007). It was derived from
the NAT'L C'fR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PRlVATI': SCfl . UNIVEHSI>: SURV I·:Y,
CHAHACTE RISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN TH~~ UNITED STATES: THE 2003-2004 PI{IVATE
SCHOOL UNIVImSE SURVEY (March 2006).
:3. IDEA/2004 deni es disabled students who are parentally-e nrolled in private
schools an individual right to special education services. 34 C. F.R. § :oO(l.l :n(a) --(c)
(2007). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130-300.144 (2007) . Thus,
Congress ha s virtually guara nteed that the needs of private school pupils would rcel!ive
a less focu sed a nd thoughtful exami nation than their public school counterparts.
4. 34 C.F.R. §§ :oOO.l 37(a)--(c), 300.1 34 . In terms of sheer numbers. how ever, the
negative impact on students attending religious schools is far greate r. See supra, note
2. Moreover, when state constitutional and statutory enactm ents limit assi st a nce to
students atte nding religious schools, but not private non- sectaria n schools, t he adverse
impact is exacerbated.
5. See lDEA/2004 20 U.S. C. § l400(d)(l)(A).
6. TD EA/2004 continues the inequitable treatment of disabled students enro ll ed
in religious schools, which treatment unambi guously existed in its predecessor statute
(IDEA/97), and arguably in earli er versions of the Act. See Ind ividuals with Disabi lities
Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, lll Stat. 37 (1997).
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treatment of home-schooled students.
Part III considers the rights of disabled students enrolled in
sectarian schools to receive on-site services. This part reviews
the Establishment Clause restrictions and whether the Free
Exercise Clause requires the state to provide services
comparable to those received by publicly-enrolled pupils.
Part IV scrutinizes IDEA/2004's treatment of students
enrolled in sectarian schools under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Part V looks at IDEA/2004's decision-making process
concerning special education for privately-schooled students
under IDEA/2004; it then asks whether an adequate remedy
exists under state law for arbitrary determinations by the
applicable agency.
Part VI focuses on state legislative enactments which
provide benefits to parentally-enrolled private school pupils
with disabilities in excess of IDEA/2004's requirements.
Part VII examines the impact of restrictive state
constitutional religion clauses and statutes on the right of
disabled students enrolled in sectarian schools to receive IDEAmandated services. 7 The availability of IDEA/2004's "by-pass"
procedures to overcome these prohibitions and deliver such
support is examined as well.x
7. Arguabl y, if t he SEA m· LEA employees furnished direct assistance to such
stu dent s, it would he for th e benefit of the student, and would not result in direct or
indirect aid to the religious school. Thi s may satisfy state constitutional restrictions.
Sec, e . ~ .. Biiy Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. T . ex rel. R., 405 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 (E.D.
N.Y. 200!>), t}(u:atcd (or lac!~ of federal subject matter jurisdiction , 485 F.3d 7:30 (2nd
Cit·. 2007).
H. As1;uming that there are no state constitutional bars to state provisions of
s pecial education and related services to parentall y-placed disabled pupils, IDEA/2004
creates potential complications due to its ''maintenance of effort" requirements. S ee
lDEA/2004 § l412 (a)(l8)(A). Th e "maintenance of effort" requires that a state "not
reduce the amount of State financial support for special education and r elated services
fur children with disabilities, or otherwise made available because of the excess costs of
educatin g those chi ldren, below the amount of that support for the preceding fiscal
Yl~ar." /d. Thus, whil e supplementation of lDEA/2004 funding by states is permitted,
agencies risk bein g re4uired to continu e the established funding level in future yea rs,
notwithstanding any newly arising fisca l constraints. See, Letter to DeLaura, 36 IND .
WITH DISABILITIES i<:DUC. L. REP . 38 (Office of Special Education Progra ms 2001)
(explaining that if a city discontinued funding LEA services to parentally-placed
private school students with disabilities. the IDEA's Part B "maintenance of effort"
requirement might ob ligate the LEA to continue the established non-federal funding
level). Since the maintenance of effort requirement app lies only to the total amount, or
per eapita a moun t . from local funds actually expended, or the combination of State and
local funds actually expend ed for educating s pecial needs children. the Act would not
necessarily eompel an LEA to co ntinue to spend state and local monies on private
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Part VIII integrates Parts II through VII to propose certain
amendments to IDEA/2004, as well as state statutory
remedies, to rectify the inequities described in those sections.
Part IX concludes by asserting that provisions requiring
comparable educational programs and services to parentallyenrolled private school children with disabilities would better
serve the overarching purpose of the Act, which is to provide
children with disabilities an appropriate education, 9 without
disrupting the delicate balance of power set out between state
and federal governments in our constitutional scheme.
II. IDEA/2004
A. General Provisions
IDEA/2004 provides federal money to assist state education
agencies ("SEAs") and local education agencies ("LEAs") in
educating children with disabilities. This funding is
conditioned upon compliance with extensive goals and
procedures. 10 11 The Act requires states to provide disabled
school students. ld.
9. Regar dless of a private school's sectarian affiliation, private school students
may be entitl ed to educational benefits under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 749, if
the school directly or indirectly receives federal fin ancial assistance. See Cain v.
Archdiocese of Kan. City, 508 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Kan. 1981). Even when private
schools do not receive fed eral financial assistance, they are subject to the public
accommodations provisions of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Education
Act. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12 181-82. Religious institutions are exempted from the
Departme nt of Justice's authority to investigate disability di scrimination complaints
against public and private elementary and secondary schools, alleging viol ations of
Title Ill. See OCR Senior Staff Memorandum , 19 I ND. WTTH DISABlLITlES Enuc. L. REP.
889 (1992) (ex plaining the jurisdictional limits of the U.S . Department of Ju stice, as
against r eligious institutions under the ADA).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 12:34(c). The U.S. Department of Education audits states' use of
IDEA fund s afte r their receipt, and may order states to refund amounts that were
spent imprope rly. ld; 20 U.S.C. § 12:34(a); 34 C.F.R. § 76.910. See La. State Bd. of
Secondary Educ. v. U.S. De p't of Educ. , 881 F 2d 204, 205- 207 (5th Cir. 1989)
(reversing decision that California must repay $1.2 million not ob ligated during correct
time fram e, on the ground that the decision went beyond issues identified in notice of
hearing). But see Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 864 F.2d 655, 659- 660 (7th Cir. 1988)
(requiring State Board of Education to refund money despite aq{ument that state
superintendent was responsible for misapplication of fund s) .
IDEN2004 is interpreted under Congress's s pending power. Sec Schaffer ex rel.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); U.S. CONST. art. l , § 8, cL 1. (This is a grant to
Congress to spe nd money to provide for th e "general welfare of the United States.")
Because the power to legislate under the Spending Clause rests on wheth er the state
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract, those condition s Congress
inten ds to impose on the funding recipie nt must be expressed unambiguou sly. See Bd.
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children with a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") 12
which includes "special education 13 and related services." 14
IDEA/2004 recognizes thirteen categories of disability 15 plus, at
of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, n. 26 (1982)
(interpreti ng the EHA of 1975); Sch. Dist. of the City of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S.
De p't of Educ., 5 12 F.3d 252, 26 1 (6th Cir. 2008) (invalidating unfunded mandate
requireme nt of the No Chil d Left Behind Act as interpreted by the Secretary, on t he
ground that the statute did not give clear notice to funding r ecipie nts that they would
bear t he cost of compliance above federally supported a mounts) , reh'g granted en bane,
opinion vacated (May 1, 2008) (no dete rmination on t he merits has bee n made in this
appea l).
11. Th e "clear statement rule" is one of several gen eral restrictions on
congressional spending a uthority. S. D. v. Dole, 483 U.S . 203, 207- 08 (1987)
(conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on state's adopting minimum drinking
age of twenty-one comports with Article l's Spending Clause requirements).
Congressional action must be in pursuit of the general welfare, th e conditions must be
relate d to the federal interest being pursued, the financial incentives must not amount
to coercion, an d the conditions must com port with other con stitutional provisions. ld.
12. TDEA/2004 § 1401(9) define s free a ppropriate public education as "[S)pecial
education a nd r elated services that-(A) have been provided at public expense, under
public su pervision a nd direction, a nd without charge; (B) meet the standards of the
State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool , ele mentary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education progra m required under section 1414(d) of thi s
t itl e." This definition is the same as t he one that appeared in IDEA/97 §1401(8).
13. IDEA/2004 § 1401(29) and 34 C.F. R. § 300.39 (2007) define "special education"
as "specially designed instruction, a t no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of
a child with a disability, including- (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the
hom e, in hospitals and institutions, a nd in other settings; and (B) instruction in
physical education." Special education includes: "(i) Speech-language pa thology
services, or any other related service, if the service is considered special educa tion
rather than a related servi ce under State standards; (ii) Travel training; a nd (i ii)
Vocational education." 34 C. F.R. § 800.39(a)(2) (2007). S ee al.~o 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3)
(2007) ("Specially designed instru ction means adapting, as appropriate t.o the need s of
a n eli gible child ... t he conte nt, methodology, or delivery of ins truction- (i) To a ddress
the unique needs of the child that resul t fro m the child's disability; and (ii) To ensure
access of the child to the general cur riculum , so that the child can meet th e educational
standards within the jurisdiction of the public agency that app ly to all ch ildren"). 34
C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(:-l) (2007).
14. See :34 C.F.R. § :300.34(a) (2007) ("Related services mea ns transportation and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as are r equired to assist
a child with a disabili ty to benefit from special education, and includes speechlang uage pathology and au diology services, interpreting services, psychological
services, physical and occupational thera py, recreation, including therapeutic
recreation, ea rl y ide ntification a nd assess me nt of disabilities in children, counseling
ser vices, including rehabilitation coun selin g, orie ntation and mobility services , and
medi cal services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. Related services a lso include
sc hool health services and sc hool nurse services, social work services in schools, and
pare nt counseling and tra ining."). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300. 34(b)( l ) (2006) ("Related
services do not include a medical device that is surgically implanted, the opti mization
of that device's functioning (e.g. mapping), maintenance of the device, or the
replacement of the device ."). E ach of th e related services listed in 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(a)
is defined in§§ il00.84(c)(l)- (16). This r egulation implements IDEA/2004 § 1401(26).
15. il4 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(l)- (l::l) (2007). These disabiliti es a r e: a utism, deaf-
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the discretion of the states, one additional category of
disability. 16
To be eligible for special education and related services
under IDEA/2004, a student must be between three and
twenty-one years old 17 and meet the requirements of a two-part
test. First, the student must qualify under one or more of the
thirteen disability categories, or the fourteenth, where
applicable. 18 Second, the child must need special education and
related services as a result of his or her disability. 19

blindness, deafness, emotional disturb a nce, hearing impairment, menta l re ta rdation,
multipl e disabilities, orthopedic impairment, other health impedime nts, specific
lea rnin g disa bilities, speech and la n guage impairment, traumatic bra in injury, and
vis ua l imp airment. Id.
16 . .'3 4 C.F.R § :iOO.S(b) (2007) prov id es that the term "child wi t h a di sability"
a ges t hree through nine may include a child "(1 ) fw]ho is experie ncing developmental
delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instwments
a nd procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical developm e nt , cogniti ve
developm e nt, communication development , social or emotional developme nt. or
ada pti ve development; and (2) [w]ho, by r ea son thereof, needs specia l edu cation and
re lated se rvices." (emphasis added)
This s ta ndard is incorporated in IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (:3)(R) . A st ate which
ad opts t he term "developmental delay" under § :300.8(b) determines wh eth e r it applies
to children aged three through nine, or to a subset of that age range, for e xample, ages
three through five. See 34 C.F.R. § :l00.111(b) (2007). Although a sta t e may not compel
an LEA t o adopt and use th e t erm developmental delay for children within its
juri sdicti on, those LEAs choosing to do so must employ the state's definition. See :34
C. F.R §§ 300.111 (b)(2)-(:3) (2007). lf a state does not adopt the te rm developmental
delay , a n LEA may not indepe nde ntl y use that term for esta blis hing IDEA/2004
eli gibility. See :'l4 C.F.R. § 300.lll(h)(4) (2006) . The authority for a doption of this
regul ation is IDEA/2004 § 1401 (:J)(B).
17. S ee 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.101 - l 02 (2007). A s tate need not provide IDEA/2004
Pa rt B services to children with disabili t ies ages three , four or five if "inco nsis te nt with
State la w or practice or the order of a ny court with respecting the pre vi sion of public
education" for nondisabled childre n in tha t age group. 34 C.F.R. § :300.102(a ) (2007). If
a Sta te does not provide public educa tion to nondisabled children under age six. then it
is not required to provide services unde r IDEN2004 Part B until such children attain
age six. S ee 34 C.F.R § :300.102(a)(l) (2007).
18. See 34 C.F.R. § :-lOO.S(c)(l)- (1 :3) (2007); :34 C.F.R. ~ :300.8(b) (2007) (the
fourteen th disability is separate a nd is applicable at the discretion of t he st a te).
19. S ee IDEA/2004 ~ 1401(i3) (A)(ii). Thi s definition is implemented a t 34 C.F.R. §
:300.8(a)( l ) (2007). IDEN2004 conta ins va ri ous exclusions from eligibili ty. Accordin g to
20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(5)(A), a ch ild s hall not be det ermined to he a child with a di sability
if th e "det erminant factor" is a "lac k of a ppropriate instruction in reading, including
the esse ntial components of rea ding ins t ruction [a s defined in th e No Ch ild Left Behind
Act ("'NCLI3"), :34 C.F.R. § 300. :306(b)(l )(i)]. NCLB defines t he te rm "essential
compone nts of reading instruction' to mean: "explicit and syste ma ti c instruction in
phone mic a wareness; phonics; vocabulary development; reading flu ency, including oral
r eading skills; and reading comprehen sion strategies.
20 U.S. C. § 6:368(3).
Addition ally, IDEA retained th e previous law's exclusion from eligibility for
det ermina nt factors of limited F:nglis h pr oficiency and lack of instruction in math. 20
u.s.c. § 1414(c)(5)(B)--(C); 34 C.F'.R. ~ aoo. :'l 06(b)(l)(ii)-(iii).
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Once the student is determined to be IDEA/2004 eligible,
the child must receive an individualized educa tion program
("IEP"). 20 IEP teams must formulate the IEP before they make
a placement decision. 21 2 2
IEPs are written documents 23 created by IEP teams 24
which detail the individual services required to accommodate
the educational needs of the disabled student. The IEP mu st be
provided in the "least r estrictive environment." 25 IDEA/2004
20. See IDEA/2004 at§ 1414 (d)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300. 323(a) (2007).
21. :-l4 C. F.R. § :300.116(b)(2) (2007). The 1999 regulations impleme nting
IDEA/97, :-l4 C.F.R. § 300. 552(h)(2) (1999), provided th a t place ment decisions could be
made only afte r the development of an IEP and in accordance with its terms. Th e
appendi x to the impl ementing regu lations explained: "The appropriate placemen t for a
pa rticular child with a disability ca nnot be determin ed until after decisions have been
made about the child's needs and the services that the public agency will provide to
mee t those needs. These decision s must be made at the IEP meeting, and it would not
be permissible to first place the child and the n develop the lEP. T herefore, th e IEP
must be developed before pl acement." 34 C. F.R. § 300 (app. A, question 14) (1999). The
2007 reg ulations continued this require ment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(h)(2) (2007). They
provide that placement decisions can be made only after development of an IEP an d in
accordance with its te rms. Id.
22. In essence, placement establi s hes the location to implement the child's
IEP. Id . This is controlled by what the least re strictive environment for th e child is . See
generally :34 C.F.R. §§ :300.114-300. 120 (2007). Effective place me nt depends upon the
TEP. See :34 C.F.R. ~:300 .1 16(b)(2) (2007). Genera lly, unless the IEP requires otherwise,
when deciding where to educate the child, pri01·it.y should he given to a place as close to
the child's hom e as possible. See :34 C.F.R. § :300. ll6(b)(:3) (2007). Further, each public
agency must ensure that unless the IEP of a child r equires otherwise, th e school that
th e child would norm ally atte nd should educate the child. See 34 C. F .R. § 300. 116(c)
(2007).
23. 34 C.F.R. § 300. :320(a) (2007) (implementing IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(I)(A)(i)). Th e mle defines a n IEP as "a written stateme nt for each child with a
disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in a meeting in accordance with" the
require ments of IDEA/2004. The require ments for such mee tings are set forth at :34
C.F.R. §§ 300. :12 1-:300. 328 (2007).
24. See IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)( 1)(B). IDEA/2004 identifies both
mandatory and permitted members of the IEP team. IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(l)(B)- (D). New provisions from IDEA/2004, 20 U.S.C . § 1414(d)(1)(C),a nd 34
C.F. R. § :300.:321(e) (2007) prescribe co nditions und er which the attendance of an
otherwise required member may be excused or not required. The IEP team must
engage in a ge nuine delibera tive process about t he disa bled child's individual needs for
programs and services. Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. :3()2 F. 3d 840.
858-59 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied. 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Spielberg v. Henrico County
Pub. Sch. , 853 F.2d 256, 258- 259 (4th Cir. 1988). This requ ire ment includes providing
the parents with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of their
child's IEP. Id. Where school officials predetermine what a child's services should be,
prior to the IEP team meeti ng, courts may annul the IEP. See, e.g., Deal, :392 F.:-ld at
858-59 (annulling an IEP since parents' IEP pa rticipation was a matter of form and
after the fact): W.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range Sch. Di st. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479,
1484-14 85 (9th Cir. 1992).
25. :34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2) (2007) provides: Each public age ncy must ensure
that-(i) To th e maximum exte nt appropriate, childre n with di sa bilities, including
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lists the eight required components that must be included in
every child's IEP. 26 For disabled children who have limited
children in public or pri vate institutions or other ca re faci lities, are ed ucated with
children who are non·disabled; and (ii) Special classes, se parate schooling or other
removal of children with disabilities from the regular educa tion a l environment occurs
onl y if the nature or severity of the disability is such that educatio n in r·egular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be ach iPved satisfactoril y.''
ID EN2004 §1 4l 2(a)(5)(A) contains this langu age. IDEA/2004 defines "supplemen tary
aid s and servi ces" as "aids, services, and other supports tha t are provided in regul ar
education classes or othe r educational -related settings to enabl e children with
disabilities to be educated with nondisahled children to the maximum extent
appropri ate." See IDEA/2004 § 1401(::33). The 2004 amendments har sta te s from using
"a funding mechanism by whi ch [they] distribute[] fund s on the bas is of the type of
setting in which a child is served that will result in the failure to provide a child with a
disability a [free appropriate public education ] according to the uniyue needs of the
child as described in the child's I EP." JDEA/2004 § 141 2(a)(5)(B)(i). The conference
committee's comment to ID EA/2004 §1412(a)(5)(13) describes th e continuum of
place ment [from least to most restrictive] as "instruction in regular classes, specia l
classes, special schools, home instructio n, and in struction in hospita ls and
institutions."
26. JDEA/2 004 § l414(d)(l)(A)(i)(I)-(VIII). These are: (I) a statement of the child's
prese nt level s of academic achievement and functional performance, im:ludin g- (aa)
how the child's dis ability affects th e child's in vol vem ent an d progress in thP general
education curriculum ; (bb) for preschool ehild rcn, as appropriate, how th e disability
affects the child's participation in ap propriate activities: and (cc) for children with
disa bilities who take a ltern ate assessments aligned to a lternate ach ievement
standards, a description of benchmarks or short-term objectives; (II) a statem ent of
measu r able annual goals, including acade mic and functional goals design ed to- (aa)
meet the child's needs that result from the child's disabili ty to enable the child to be
involved in and make progress in the ge neral education curriculum; and (bb) meet each
of the child's other educational needs that result fro m the child's disability; (I II) a
description of how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals described in
subclau se (II) will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress the child is
making toward meeting the annual goals (such as through the use of quarterly or other
periodic reports, concurrent with the issuance of report cards) will be provided; (IV) a
statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and
services, based on peer-reviewed r esearch to the extent practicable, to be provided to
the child, or on beha lf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or
supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child- (aa) to advance
appropriately toward attaining the annual goals; (bb) to be involved in and make
progress in the general education curriculum in accordance with subclause (I) an d to
participate in extracurricular and other nonacad emic activities; and (cc) to be educated
and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children in th e
activities described in this subparagraph; (V) an explanation of the extent, if any, t o
which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class and
in the activities described [above]; (VI)-(aa) a statement of any individual appropriate
accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic achieve ment and
functional performance of the child on State and districtwide assessments consistent
with section 1412(a)(l6)(A): and (bb) if the IEP Team determines that the child shall
take an alternative assessment on a particular State or district wide as sessment of
student achievement, a statement of why-(AA) the child cannot participate in the
regular assessment; and (BB) the particular alternative assessment selected is
appropri ate for the child; (VII) the projected date for t he beginning of the services and
modifications described in subclause (IV), and the anticipated frequency, loca tion, and
duration of those services and modifications; and (VIII) beginning not later th an the
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English proficiency ("LEP"), the IEP team must consider the
language needs of the child, as well. 27 As long as the IEP meets
the above-mentioned requirements, nothing more is required. 2 ~
29

IEPs must be reviewed by the IEP team at least once
annually. 30 At the annual review, the IEP team evaluates the
efficacy of the child's IEP, and makes appropriate changes to
meet the child's current needs. 31 IEP teams must formulate the

first IEP to be in effect when the child is 16, and updated annually thereafter-(aa)
appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition
assessments related to training, education, employment, and, where appropriate,
independent living skills; (bb) the transition services (including courses of study)
needed to assist the child in reaching those goals; and (cc) beginning not later than 1
year before the child reaches the age of majority under State law, a statement that the
child has been informed of the child's rights under this title, if any, that will transfer to
the child on reaching the age of majority under section 1415(m) .. . .
27. :34 C.F.R. § 300.:324(a)(2)(ii) . Among the factors IEP teams should discuss
concerning limited English proficiency students are the extent to which the child
should (1) receive instruction in English or his native language, (2) participate in the
general curriculum, and (:l) receive English language tutoring on his IEP. See 64 Fed.
Reg. 12406, 12589 (1999). These provisions were not carried into the 2007 regulations
impll•menting lDEA/2004. However, logic and good pedagogy would dictate they retain
their vitality.
28. See IDEA/2004 §1414(d)(1)(A)(ii).
29. IDEA/2004 §1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(l)-(VIII) made the following changes in required
IEP content, as compared to IDEA/97 § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(VITI) and its 1999
implementing regulations: in section I, "academic" and "functional" were inserted
before "achievement" and performance, respectively; except for students who take
alternative assessments aligned to alternative achievement standards, the
requirement for benchmarks or short-term objectives for each goal has been eliminated;
the IEP must state how the child's progress toward meeting annual goals will be
measured and when reports on such progress will be provided; to the extent practicable
the special education and related services to be provided the child must be based on
peer-reviewed research; IEPs must contain a statement of individual appropriate
accommodations necessary "to measure the academic achievement and functional
performance" of the child on State and district assessments and the term
"modifications" has been deleted from the text; where the IEP team determines that a
child shall participate in alternative assessments, it must explain why the child cannot
participate in the regular assessment and why the alternative assessment it selected is
appropriate; a statement of needed transition services when the student attains age
fourteen is no longer required; however, IDEA/2004 mandates that the first IEP in
effect when the student reaches age sixteen must contain appropriate, measurable
postsecondary goals and a list of the transition services needed to assist the student in
achieving those goals.
30. See IDEA/2004 § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(1) (2007).
31. IDEA/2004 § 1414(d)(4)(A). The statute lists five factors IEP teams should
consider in recommending IEP changes: (1) any lack of expected progress toward the
annual goals and in the general curriculum; (2) the results of any reevaluation; (3)
information about the child provided to, or by, the parents during the evaluation
process; (4) the child's anticipated needs; and (5) other matters. IDEA/2004
§1414(d)(4)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(l)(ii) (2007).
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IEP before they make a placement decision. 32
IDEA/2004 requires particularized written notice whenever
the LEA proposes or refuses to change "the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the
provision of a free appropriate public education to the child."-' 3
1. The child find obligation

IDEA/2004 imposes on funding reCipients the so-called
"child find" obligation. 34 Child find requires states to identify,
locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing
within their respective state. 35 This obligation encompasses all
children with disabilities who are homeless, wards of the State,

32. See IDEA/2004 at § 141 4(d) (2)(A); :34 C .F .R. § 300.:32 :~(a) (2007). Th e 199~J
r egulation s implementing IDEA/97 at 34 C. P.R. § 300.552(b)(2) ( Hl99) provided that
pl ace me nt decis ions can be m a de onl y a fter the developm e nt of an lEI'. and in
accord a nce with its terms. 34 C .F.R. § :300 (app. A. question 14) (1999) explain ed. "The
a ppropria te place ment for a particul a r child wi th a disabili t y cannot bl' dc t<'nnin e d
un til afte r decisions have been m a de about th e child's ne<~ds and th e se rvices thnL the
publi c age ncy will provide to meet th ose needs . These decisions must he mad e at the
I E P m eeting, and it would not be permissibl e to first place the child a nd th e n de velop
the IEP. Th ere fore, the IEP must b e developed before placement." Th e 2007 regulations
continued this requirement. 34 C.F.R. § i300.116(b)(2) (2007). '!'hey providt> that
placeme nt decisions can be made only after development of an II~P and in accordanct>
with its t erm s . ld. Placements a re co ntrolled hy what is th e least rt·s tridiw
e nvironm ent for the child. See :34 C.F.R. §§ :-100.114-:100.120 (2007) . Such pla ct• rnents
are de pende nt on the IEP. See 34 C. F .R. §i300.l16(b)(2) (2007). Ge m ·rall y, unless the
IEP requires otherwi se, the child should he educated as close as possibl e t.o t he ehild's
hom e. S ee ~~ 4 C.F.R. § i300.116(b)(i3) (2007). Furthe r, each public a gt~ n cy mw;t. en s ure
t h a t unless th e IEP of a child requires some other a r range ment. th e child is educated
in t h e school that he or she would atte nd if nondisahled. S ec :34 C.F.R. ~ :lOO . IIG(c)
(2007) .
33. See IDEA/2004 § 14lfi(h)(3). Th e r equirements of the noti ce is detailed in
!D~~A/2004 § l4lfi(c)(I), which states: The notice required by subsection (b)(:\) shall
include-(A) a description of the a ction proposed or rdused hy the a ge ncy; (13) an
explana tion of why the agency proposes or refu ses to take the action and a description
of eac h evaluation proet>dure, as sessm e nt, record, or report th e agency u sed a s a basis
for the propo se d or rt>fused action; (C) a s ta tement that the parents of n child with a
disa bility h ave protection unde r the procedura l sa feguards of thi s pa rt and . if thi s
notice is not a n initial referra l for evalu a tio n, the mean s by w hich a copy t>f tht>
descript ion of the procedural s afegu a rds can be obtained; (U) sources f(n· pa n •nts to
conta ct to obtain a ssistance in unders t a nding the provis ions of this pa r t ; (I•;) a
description of other options cons id er ed by the IEL' Team and t he re a son why those
opt ions wer e rejected; and (F) a description of the factors tha t an• r e levant to th e
a gency's proposal or refusal.
:34. S ee 1DEN2004 § 1412(a)( Cl)(A). This duty entails scree ning to idt>ntify
children who are disabled, or suspected of having a disability. and be ing in nucd of
specia l education and related services, as opposed to the actual de live ry uf special
edu cation a nd related services.
::l5. /d .
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or attending private schools. 36 There are no exceptions,
regardless of the severity of the disability_}? The statute also
mandates the development of a practical method to determine
which children currently receive needed special education and
related services. 38
The breadth of the child find obligations can be surprising.
School districts' child find duties begin at birth. 39 Since child
find duties are "affirmative," a parent is not required to request
an evaluation of the child. 40 The child find obligation is
sweeping and extends to "children with disabilities in the State
who are enrolled in private, including religious, elementary
schools and secondary schools." 41 The design of child find
activities must ensure equitable participation of parentallyplaced private school children with disabilities and an accurate
count of such children. 42 Notably, IDEA/2004 imposes the child
find obligation on the LEA where the private school is
located, 43 even when the LEA is located in a different state
than where the child resides. 44 This contrasts with IDEA/97's
child find obligation, which placed this responsibility on the
school district of the child's residence. 45

:36. ld.
:n Id .
:38. See TDEA/2004 §§ 1412(a)(::l)(A), (a)(10)(A)(iii). Child find obligations were
conta ined in IDEA/97 §1412(a) and implemented in 34 C.F.R. §§:300.125 , :300. 220(a)
(1999). In the 2007 regulations, they appear in 34 C.F.R. §§ ~00.111, :300.13 1 (2007).
:39. See IDEA/2004 § 14~1 (strengthen s findings and policy on this point, as
compared with §14::ll of IDEA/97, the prior law). The duty to "child find" from birth has
been a n obligation of school districts for more than thi1·ty years . See MARK WEllER,
SPECIAL En uc . Lrnr;N!'lON TREATISE, Ch. 11 (LRl' Publications 2004).
40. See Robertson County Sch. Sys. v. King, 99 F.3d. 11:-!9 (6th Cir. 1996) (decided
under IDEA/1990). Local school districts are ordinarily responsible for carrying out
chilrl find activities for children within their jurisdiction. ld.
41. IDEA/2004 §1412(a)(10)(A)(ii)(l) (emphasis a dded). Child find duti es apply
regardless of the severity of the disability, whether the child h as ever attended or will
ever atte nd a public school, or whether the state serves infants and toddlers (zero to
two years old) under IDEA/2004 part C or presc hool children (three to five years old)
under ID~~A/20 04 part B. S ee 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.111. 300.13 1 & 800.201 (2007). Further,
the child find duty applies whe re the child is in the custody or under the jurisdiction of
any puhlic or private agency or institution. Id ..
42. :34 C.F.R. § 300. 181 (b)(1)-(2) (2007).
43. See 34 C.F.R. § 30(l.l:H(a) (2007).
44. See :34 C.F.R. S :!00.131(£) (2007).
45. 20 U.S.C. SS 14 I 2(a)(8)(A), 141 2(a)(JO)(A)(iii) (T).
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B. Private School Students Under IDEA/ 2004
1. Child find for parentally-placed private school students
'l'he rules surrounding child find are fairly equivalent for
privately-enrolled and publically-enrolled children. With
respect to privately enrolled pupils, an LEA or SEA, where
applicable, must undertake child find activities in a manner
similar to those it employs for public school children. 46 Child
find activities for children enrolled in private schools must be
completed in a time period comparable to that of children
attending public schools. 47 School districts must consult with
representatives of the private schools regarding child find
procedures. 48 The costs incurred by LEAs in conducting child
find, including individual evaluations, cannot be considered in
determining whether LEAs have met their expenditure
obligations under IDEA/2004 to parentally-placed private
school children. 49
The parent of a privately-placed child may use the due
process complaint hearing procedure when alleging a child find
violation. Unless a child find violation is alleged, the parent
may not use the due process complaint hearing procedures
(available to publicly-enrolled students with disabilities) to
obtain relief for violations of the Act. 50 Under such
circumstances, the child find complainant must allege that the
school district has failed to properly identify, locate, or evaluate
the private school student. 5 1 In the absence of an allegation of
such child find failures, parents of private school pupils must
employ the complaint resolution or other procedures adopted
by the state to obtain relief over implementation of the Act. 52 53
46. See lDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l0)(A)(ii)(III). This would include
activities such as distribution of informational brochures, provision of regular public
service announcements, staffing exhibits at health fairs, creating liaisons with private
schools, and similar activities. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,593 (2006).
47. See IDEA/2004 20 U .S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(ii)(V); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13l(e) (2007).
LEAs may not wait until they have completed evaluating publicly-enrolled students
before they conduct evaluations on those who are privately-enrolled. See 71 Fed. Reg.
46,593 (2006).
48. See IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(iii) .
49. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.13l(d), 300.133 (2007).
50. See 34 C.F.R. § 300 .140(b)(2) (2007).
51. See ~34 C.F.R. § 300.140(b)(l) (2007).
52. See 34 C.F .R. § 300.140 (2006).
53. Where child find failures occur in connection with parentally-enrolled private
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2. Expenditure of Part B funds
Although IDEA/2004 requires school districts to devote
federal IDEA/2004 Part B funds to parentally-placed private
school children with disabilities as a group , it does not obligate
the expenditure of state funds for special education and related
services for particular privately-schooled students. The
expenditure of IDEA/2004 funds must be proportionate to the
number of children enrolled in private schools within the
district, not the number of resident children in the district as
under IDEA/97. 54 In essence, IDEA/2004 measures the LEA's
financial obligation by the percentage of all private school
children with disabilities being educated within the district. 55
Although the Act does not require LEAs to expend state and
local monies for special education and related services for
parentally-placed private school children,56 IDEA/2004 does not
prohibit SEAs or LEAs from spending beyond the federal
allotment for provision of special education a nd related
services. 57
school pupil s, uncertainty exist s as to whether parents may recover tuition a nd other
costs incurred for the child's placemen t under IDEA/2004. § l412(a)(10)(C)(ii) provides
such a remedy for children "who previously r eceived special education and related
services under the authority of the agency." See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of
N. Y. v. Tom. F. ex rei. Gilbert F. , 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2nd Cir. 2006), aff'd 128 S.Ct. 1.
(2007). In Tom F. the Supreme Court, construing the salutary purposes of the law,
affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit (on a 4-4 vote, with Ju stice Kenn edy not
participating), permitting tuition reimbursement for a unilateral private school
placement where the s ubj ect child had not "previously received" special education and
related services under the auspices of the agency. ld.
54. Compare IDEA/2004 §1412(a) (10)(A)(i), with IDEA/97 § 141 2(a)( 10)(A)(i). The
2007 regulations implementing this requirement state:
To the extent consistent with the number and location of children with
disabilities who are enrolled by their parents in private, including religious,
elementary and secondary schools located in the school district served by the
LEA, provision [must be) made for the participation of those children in the
program assisted or carried out under Part B of the Act by providing them
with special education and related services in accordance with § 300.1 37
unless the [United States Department of Education] has arranged for
services to those children under the by-pass provisions [of the Act]. 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.132 (2007).
55. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.133(a) (2007).
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I).
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(IV); Letter to DeLaura, supra note 8
(commenting that there was nothing in IDEA/97 Part B that would prohibit an LEA
from using non-federal funds to provide special education services to unilaterallyplaced students).
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In determining the "proportionate amount" of part B funds
that must be devoted to parentally-placed private school
children aged three through twenty-one, LEAs are required to
conduct an annual count on any date between October 1st and
December 1st of each year. 58 This calculation determines the
amount of part B fund s that the LEA will spend on such
children in the ensuing fiscal year. 59 "Children aged three
through five are deemed to be parentally-placed private school
children with disabilities ... if they are enrolled in a private
school that meets the definition of elementary school under
§300.13. 6
Furthermore, the LEA must calculate the
proportiona te share of IDEA/2004 funds before earm arking
funds for any authorized, early intervention activities. 61 The
proportionate share is based on the total number of children
eligible, not the total children served. 62 Additionally, the school
district of location must consult with private school
representatives to determine its number of enrolled disabled
children and how to allocate the part B funds. 63 This

°

58. See 20 U.S. C. § 300.133(a)(ii)(2007) ; :34 C.F.R § 300. 1:33(d) (2007)
59. See 34 C.F.R. § a oO.l 33(c)(ii) (2007). The appen dix to part B of th e 2007
r egulations contains a h elpful ill u~tra tion as to how to perform this calculation. The
exa mple assumes that t h ere are 300 eligible students with disabili ties enrolled at th e
LEA a nd twenty eligibl e parentally-placed private school children with disabilities
en rolled in priva te schools located wit hin the LEA. Since 6.25% (20/:320) of the stud e nts
attend pri vate schools within the LEA, the private school student s as a group will be
entitled to 6.25'/\, of th e part B subgrant received by the LEA. If the LEA rece ives
$152,500 in federal fl ow t hrough funds, the example continues , the LEA mus t then
spend $9,531.25 on specia l education and related services for th e group of parentally placed private sc hool child re n with disabilities located in the LEA.
60. See 34 C.F.R § 300.133(a)(2)(ii) (2007). Under IDEA/200 4. a child who is
home-edu cated may or may not be consider ed a parenta lly-en ro ll ed pri vate sch ool
student with a disabili ty, since th e Act mak es this depe ndent upon sta te la w. See 71
Fed. Reg. 46.594 (explaining the operation of the provision). Issues related to homeeducated students are discussed in Part V.
61. :34 C.F.R. § 300.226 (2007).
62. See 34 C.F.R §300 (app. part B).
6:3. IDEA/2004 § 14 12(a)(lO)(A)(iii). This consultation requi res discuss ion w ith
private sch oo l representatives nnd representatives of p arents concerni ng, among other
t hin gs, "[hjow s pecial ed ucation and related services will be apportioned if funds are
insufficient to serve a ll parentally-placed private school chi ldren, and lh]ow and whe n
these decis ions will be made." ;{4 C.F.R. § 300. 134(d)(2)- (3) (2007). Where pa ren t s
contend th e proposed l EP deni es t heir child a FAP E, a nd th ey place the ir child
uni laterall y in a private school program which meets the ch ild 's specia l needs,
TDEA/2004 permit s th em to be re imbursed for the tuitio n a nd r elated ex pe nses they
incur if they s atisfy the su bstantive a nd procedural requirements set fo rth in t he Act.
20 U .S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). ID EA/2 004 continues without ch anging th e language
contained in IDEA/87 respecting parental reimburse ment. See 20 U.S.C. §
14 12(a)( l O)(c)(ii). For a n exten sive discussion a bout IDEA/2004 rei mburse me nt see
Lewis M. Wasserman , R ei mbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other Costs under the
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consultation must be timely and meaningful. 64

3. No individual entitlement
Parentally-enrolled private school children with disabilities
who receive special education and related services are entitled
to this right as a group, not individually. 65 Therefore, such
children may not insist on receiving their proportionate share
of part B monies for themselves. 66 LEAs' obligation then, is to
merely provide an opportunity for equitable participation in the
services funded with part B monies. 67 Moreover, the LEA in
which the private school is located "must make the final
decisions with respect to the services to be provided to eligible
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities." 68
Where parents do not contest the adequacy of the IEP
offered by the LEA and enroll the child in a private school, the
agency has no obligation to prepare or update the child's IEP. 69
The absence of an individual right for parentally-placed
children contrasts starkly with the rights of children who,
pursuant to an IEP, are placed in a private school or facility by
the LEA, as a means of furnishing a FAPE.7° In the latter case,
students retain all the procedural and substantive IDEA/2004

Individuals with Disabilities Education Impro vement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN's J.
LE(; :\L COMME:--IT. 171 , (2006).
64. See :34 C.F.R. § 300.1:33(c)(1)(i) (2007).
6fi. 34 C.F.R. § .'300.137(a) (2007).
66. 34 C.F.R. § 300.137(a) (2007) provides: "No parentally-placed private school
child with a di sa bility has an individual right to receive so me or all of the special
education and rela ted services tha t the child would receive if enroll ed in a public
school." Pla inl y then, under IDEN2004, "pare ntally-placed private school children with
di sa bilities may receive a different a mount of services than childre n with disabilities in
public schools." :~ 4 C.F.R. § 300.138(a)(2) (2007). Th e re are apparently no exceptions to
thi s rule. !DEAJ2004's predecessor, IDEAJ97 , also mad e clear that parentally-placed
private school children had no individual right to a FAPE. S ee aloo 7l Fed. Reg. 46.591)
(2006} .
67. See 71 F'ed . Reg. 46,595 (2006).
6~. S ee :34 C.F.R. § 1:i7(b)(2) (2007).
69. Discussion acco mpanying the 1999 regulat ions implem enting IDEN97 mad e
clear that there was no provision which compels a school district to develop an IEP th at
assumes a public placement for each private school s tude nt eac h yea r. Since the
pare nts may in voke th eir child's right to return to the public schools a nd recei ve a
FAPE, LEAs "must be prepared to develop a n IEP a nd to provide FAPE to a pri vate
school child if the child 's parents re-e nroll the child in the public school." 64 Fed. Reg.
12,601 (1999). lDEAJ2004's implementing 1·egulation s talk only about services plans
for priva tely-enrolled students. 34 C.F.R. § 300.132(b).
70. :34 C.F.R. § :100.137 (2007); 70 Fed. Reg. 35846 & 3fi847 (2005).
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rights enjoyed in public schools. 71

4. Services plans
In contrast to the detailed IEP requirements imposed on
LEAs by the IDEA for eligible publically-enrolled pupils, LEAs
must develop and implement a mere services plan for each
privately-schooled child designated by the local district to
receive special education and related services. 72 The services
plan "describes the specific special education and related
services that the LEA will provide to the child in light of the
services that the LEA has determined . . . it will make
available to [the] parentally-placed private school child[ ] with
disabilities." 73 IDEA/2004's implementing regulations provide
that "[t]he services plan must, to the extent appropriate, meet
the requirements [set forth in the IEP content for publicly
enrolled students]." 74 Although it is unclear as to which IEP
components must be included in the services plan, it should at
least include a statement of what special education, related
services, and supplementary aids and services the child will
receive. 75 The services plan should include goals for special
education and related services of the kind included in IEPs. 76
LEAs must also adjust to the established lifestyle of the
student by providing on-site services.1 7 Such goals should
71. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.145-300.147 (2007).
72. See 34 C.F.R § 300.132(b) (2007). The United States Departme nt of Education
di scourages LEAs from using IEPs as the child's services plan. 71 Fed. Reg. 45,596
(2006). This is because th e IEP will generally include much more services th a n just
those to which a parentally- placed private school child with a disability may r eceive. if
designated to receive such services. !d . There is nothing, however, in these regul a tions
tha t would prevent a state that provides more services to parentally-placed private
school childre n with disabilities than it is requi red to und er the Act to use an IEP in
pl ace of a services plan , consistent with state law. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46, 595- 46,596
(2006).
73. :H C.F.R. § 300.l 38(b)(l) (2007).
71. 31 C.F.R. § 30ru:~S (b)(2) (2007) (emph asis added) .
75. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006) (explaining the services plan require ment of :i4
C.F.R. §300. 1:3S(h)(1): "The services plan also must, to the exte nt a ppropriate, meet the
IEP content, developme nt. review, a nd revi sion requirements described in section
636(d) of the Act . .
as to the services that are to he provided"). Ana logous
require ments ap ply to Individual Family Service Plans ("TFSPs") for ehildren with a
di sability aged three to five years. See 34 C.F.R. § :300 .1:38(2)(i) (2007) ; 71 Fed. Reg.
46,596 (2006).
76. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006).
77. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,596 (2006). Th e commentary mak es clear th a t t his
reco mmendation is limited by fed e ral First Am e ndment Es tablishm ent Clause a nd
applicable state constitution a l and statutory considerations.
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provide, at a minimum, programmatic guidance to the special
education and related service providers.

5. Program and service delivery
Program and delivery service vehicles are provided for both
privately and pubically-enrolled students. The special
education and related services in a services plan must be
provided by employees of the public agency, or through a
contract entered into between the agency and "an individual,
association, agency, organization or other entity." 78 The special
education and related services, as well as any materials and
equipment employed in rendition of same, must be "secular,
neutral and nonideological." 79

6. Transportation
LEAs must furnish transportation to a parentally-placed
child with a disability where services are offered off-site and if
such transportation is necessary to enable the child to receive
the services offered under a services plan. 80 If services are
offered to a parentally-placed child with a disability at a site
separate from the child's private school, the LEA may be
required to transport the child to and from that other site. 81

7. Personnel qualifications
The personnel qualifications required for public programs
are vastly superior to those required by private entities.
IDEA/2004 requires "highly qualified" personnel for public
agencies responsible for delivery of special programs and
services to children with special needs. 82 83 These r equirements
78. a4 C.F. R. ~ :lOO .l :~8(c){ l) (2007).
7~J. :14 C.F. R. ~ :JOO. l :i8(c)(2) (2007).
80. See :14 C.F.R. ~ :'\00.1:19(b)( 1) (2007). This is because den ial of such
transportation ma y efff~ etivel y de ny the child of t.h<·' opportunity to benefit from t he
services offered in the services plan. 7 1 Peel. He g. 46,1)96 (2006). The expenses incurred
in providin g such transportation may he deducted from the proportional share of funds
allocated to parentally-placed private sc hool children . See :34 C. F .R. ~ :~00.1:~9(b)(2)
(2007).
81. See C.F.R. ~ :I00.1 ::19(b)(l)(A) (2007).
82. See :14 C. F.R. ~ :l00.18 (2007).
8:3. IDEA/2004 revised s ub stantially the qualification requirements to ens ure
that personnel which carry out t he purposes of part B ar e appropri a tely a nd
adeq uatel y prepared and trained. This includes ass uring that those personnel h ave the
content knowledge and skills to serve students with disabilities. Sec 20 U.S.C.

s
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apply to special education teachers of core academic subjects,
special education teachers in general, special education
teachers applying alternative standards, special education
teachers of multiple subjects, and they also apply a separate
high objective uniform State standard of evaluation [HOUSSE]
standards for special education teachers. 84 The requirements
do not apply to teachers hired by private elementary schools
and secondary schools, including private school teachers hired
or contracted by LEAs to provide equitable services to
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities
under 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(a)(1). 85

8. The rejection option
There is nothing in IDEA/2004 or its implementing
regula tions which compels parents who have placed their child
in a private school to accept the special education and/or
related services offered to their disabled child in a services
plan. It is very unlikely that Congress intended otherwise. 86

9. LEA reporting requirements
Apparently to enable SEAs to perform their oversight
functions of LEAs' compliance, each LEA must maintain
records and provide the SEA with the following information
about parentally-placed private school children: the number of
children it evaluated, the number of children it determined to
have disabilities, and the number of children it served. 87

10. R elinquishment and reinstatement of the FAPE obligation
Where the LEA of residence determines the child is
IDEA/2004 eligible, and parents make clear their intent to
keep their child in a private school located in another LEA,

141 2(a)( 14).

84. See :34 C.F.R. § 300 .1 8 (2 0()7).
1-15. See :14 C.F. R. § :300.11-i (2007); 71 Fed. R eg. 46,595 (2006).
86. Even for students who are e ntitled to a free appropriate public education, the
agency ''may not use ... the due process procedures .. . in order to obtai n agreement or a
ruling that th e service~ may be provided t.o the ch ild." :l4 C.F.R. § 300.ilOO(b)(:l)( 2007).
Mo reover, if the agency t ries, but fail s to obtain parental con sent, the school di s trict
"'will not be considered to be in violation of the r equirement to make ava ila ble FAPE to
the child for failur e to provide th e child with the special education a nd re late d services
for which [it] requ est s con sent ." 34 C.F.R. § 800. 300(b)(4)(i).
87. See 34 C.F.R. ~ 300.132(c) (2007).
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IDEA/2004 relieves the LEA of residence from its obligation to
furnish a F APE to that child. sx This provision assists LEAs in
defining their then current obligation to the child and the
parents in understanding what services they may be
relinquishing by unilaterally enrolling their child in a private
school. However, parents exercising this option may later
decide to refer the child to their district of residence for
provision of a FAPE, in which case the district of residence will,
under most circumstances, have to comply. 89 90

11. LEA consultation obligation
ID EA/2004 requires school districts to "timely and
meaningfui[ly]" consult with private school representatives and
representatives of parents of private school students when
designing and developing the services plan for privatelyschooled students.'>' The Act requires such consultation to
include how, where, and by whom services will be provided to
private school students, as well as the types of services (both
the direct and alternative delivery options) that will be
offered. 92 If the private school officials disagree with the LEA's
decision not to provide direct services, the LEA must furnish a

IlK. S<'c 71 Fed . Reg. 4G,59:i (2006) (comm enting on 34 C.F.R. § 300.1:~1). Neither
the t·egulation s themselves nor the co mme ntary accompanying the regulations indicate
how an LEA asce rta ins pare ntal "intent" in this regard . Surely, the LEA of residence
may deve lop a form containing an ad(!quat(' explanation of the parents' options relative
the child's rece ipt of a FAPE !including the child's right to return to th e LEA of
residence f(,r services] with a written waiver of the right to a FAPE, or s imply offer an
I El' providing a FAPE.).
S ~J . 71 F ed. Heg. ·1G,59:i (2006). This may create conf1icts among the pe1tinent
inte rest s. For example, the LEA of residence child study team could dete rmin e that the
child is ineligible fi>r lDE/2004 b en efits upon its r eview of the record, and any
additional eva luat.ions it perform ~ . Moreover, it could agree tha t the child is eligible for
services but that th e kinds of programs and services which are appropriate for the child
are different than those recommended by the LEA of loca tion. Further, the duration ,
t'retJUt' TH:y or intensity of t hl, services deemed appropriate might vary a s betwee n LEAs.
90. ~14 C.F.R ~ :100.G22(b)(4) r equires parental consent for r elease of information
about parentall y- placed pri vate school children betwee n LEAs. Therefore, nothing in
the regulation s would prohibit parents from requesting that their child be evaluated by
the LEA res pon sibl e for FAPE (usually under state law th e LEA where the parents
residP) for purposes of having a FAPE m a de available to th e child, while at the same
timf' re que::;ting the LEA in which the private school is located to evaluate the child for
purposes of considering th e child for equitable services. 71 Fed. Reg. 46.59:3 (200G).
Ne vert.hdess, th e ])(),J di scourages repeated test ing of s uch children by sepa ra te LEAs.
/d.
91. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 1412(a)(JO)(A)(iii).
92. /ri.
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written explanation of that decision. 93 LEAs must also confer
with private schools as to when service allocation decisions will
be made by the LEA and how services will be apportioned if
funds are insufficient to serve all children. 94 When the
consultation process has occurred, LEAs must obtain a written
affirmation signed by representatives of participating private
schoolsY 5 If such information is not forthcoming within a
reasonable period of time after it is sought, the LEA must
forward documentation of the consultation process to the state
agency. 96
Private school officials may lodge a complaint regarding
either the consultation process or whether the school gave "due
consideration" to the views of the private school. 97 The
complaint is made to the SEA and must assert the grounds for
the "non-compliance." 98 The LEA must respond to the SEA
with "appropriate documentation." 99 Although states may use
their regular state complaint resolution process for addressing
such disputes, 100 they may employ other procedures for
accomplishing this purpose, as well. 101 Where the private
school is dissatisfied with the decision of the SEA, it may
submit a complaint to the United States Department of
Education ("USDOE"), in which case the SEA must provide
corresponding documentation to the USDOE. 102

C. IDEA! 2004 and Home-Schooled Students
IDEA/2004's regulatory scheme 103 assigns to states the
responsibility of defining "private schools or facilities" under
the Act for both elementary 104and secondary 105 students. Thus,

9:J. S ee 20 U. S. C.§ 141 2(a)(10)(A)(iii)(V).
94. Id.; See :34 C.F.R. § 300.134 (2007).
95. S ee 20 U.S. C. § 1412(a) (lO)(A)(iv) . Wh ere private school representa t ives
ca nnot confe r in perso n th e public a gency personall y may ob tain input from t he
represe nta tives hy tel e phone. S ee 71 Fed . Reg. 46,596 (2006).
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(A)(iv); 34 C.F.R. § 300 .1 35 (2007).
97. S ee 20 U.S. C.§ 141 2(a)( l 0)(v)(J).
98. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(lO)(v)(II).
99. Id.
100. See :34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151 - 300.1 5:3 (2007).
10 1. S ee 34 C. F.R. §§ 300.136; 300.1 40(c)(2) (2007).
102. S ee 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(l)(A)(v)(ll) .
103. S ee :34 C. F .R. §300.130 (2007).
104. S ee :34 C.F.R. §300. 13 (2007).
105. S ee 34 C. F.R. § 300.36 (2007).
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state law determines whether a disabled, home-schooled pupil
is a private school pupil eligible for the proportional
distribution of services funded with IDEA/2004 money. 106 This
creates a hodgepodge of approaches across states. Thus,
IDEA/2004 further curtails the rights of home-schooled pupils
relative to the already diminished rights enjoyed by students
educated at places deemed "private schools" under state law.
107

III. THE IMPACT OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF DISABLED STUDENTS ATTENDING SECTARIAN
SCHOOLS TO RECEIVE SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RELATED
SERVICES FROM LEAS AND SEAs
A. Establishment Clause Considerations

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not
necessarily bar IDEA/2004 public support for special needs
children in sectarian private schools, but it does not require a
state to support the child with public funds. In the leading case
of Zobrest u. Catalina Foothills School District, 108 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause does
not bar a school district from providing a public employee to
serve as a sign language interpreter for a profoundly deaf
student placed by his parents in a Roman Catholic high school.
The Court made clear that there is no general constitutional
bar to furnishing such services on the site of a sectarian

106. These provisions concerning parentally-placed private school students do not
apply to students placed there by SEAs and LEAs for the purpose of receiving a free
appropriate public education. See :34 C.F.R. § :300.145 (20ll7).
107. See Edgerton Sch. Dist., 20 IND. WITH DISAil!LlTIES EDUC. L. REP. 126 (1993)
(reversing hearing officer's order directing school district to furnish services to home
schooled child over parent's objection). This appears to defeat the salutary purposes of
educating all disabled students. See Samuel Ashley Lambert, Finding the Way Bach
Home: Funding for Home School Children Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act,
101 COLUlvl. L. REV. 1701, 1707-29 (2001) (arguing that home schools should be
considered private schools for IDEA/2004 purposes).
Regardless of whether a home schooled child is considered a "private school" student
for purposes of receiving IDEA/2004 benefits, a school district may not compel the
parents to submit the child to an evaluation. Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-ITI Sch. Dist.,
439 F.3d 77:3 (8th Cir. 2006).
108. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.Dist .. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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school. 109
The Zobrest Court explained that the Establishment Clause
does not bar religious organizations from participating in
publicly sponsored welfare programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to
religion (disabled children) . The court held that IDEA/2004 is
such a program. 110 Upon examining the issue of whether
IDEA/2004 "advances or inhibits religion," the Court concluded
that the presence of the interpreter neither added to nor
subtracted from the religious environment of the school. 111
Moreover, the Court observed that children with disabilities
are the primary beneficiaries of IDEA/2004, and that whatever
benefits were reaped by the sectarian school were only
incidental. 112 The Court found that since the IDEA/2004
n either creates an incentive nor directly benefits religious
schools , it does not unconstitutionally encourage religion. 113

109. Id. at 8-10. Since th e parti es stipulat ed on this a ppeal th a t re ndition of the
service purs uant to IDEN2004 was clearly secular, the Supre me Co ur t did not analyze
t hi s factor in its opinion. Id. a t 4 n.l. In the court below the United Sta tes Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit , the co urt applied the three-part t es t se t forth in Lemon
v. Kurt zman, 403 U.S. 602 (1 971) (th e services must adva nce a secular legislative
pur pose, neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not res ult in excessive
government entanglement in t he reli gious mission of the sect a ri a n sc hool} ,and found
t h e service had the primary effect of ad va ncing religion. Zobrest v. Ca t a lina Foothills
Sch . Dis t. , 96:3 F.2d 1190, 11 94-96 (1992). It therefore found an Estab lish me nt Clause
viola tion. ld. Lemon cr iteria have bee n writ te n into the EDGAR regulations at 34
C.F.H. § 76.532(a ). They prohibit use of federal monies for relig iou s purposes including
pay me nt for religious wors hip, ins truction or proselyti s m or equipme nt or s upplies
furni shed by the State or its s ubgra ntees fo r any of these purposes. Td.
110. The Zobrest court reli ed in part on the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in
Mueller u. Allen, 46:3 U.S . ::J88 (1 983) in its a nalysis. 509 U .S. a t 8- 10. In Mu eller, the
Co urt held that a state statute which permitted parents to t a ke inco me ta x deductions
for educational expenses they incurred in sending their childre n to public and private
sc hools (including sectarian ones) did not violate the Establishm e nt Clause. 463 U.S. at
402- 04. The court reasoned th a t th e statute was neutral as to religion in that it
be nefitted all parents, not ju st those parents who chose to send t heir children to
w li gious schools. Id. at :'3 87. Moreover, the court saw the decision t o se nd children to
reli gious sc hools a s a pa re nt , not governm ent initiated de termi nation , t her eby avoiding
governme ntal acti vities which offe nd ed t he Establishm e nt Clause. !d . at :399.
111. Zobrest, 509 U. S. at 1:1.
11 2. /d . at 12.
ll3. ld. at 10- 13. Th e Zobrest ca se for eshadowed Mi tchell v. Helms, 5:30 U.S. 793
(2000), which held that Ch a pte r 2 of Ti tle I of th e El e mentary a nd Secondary
Education Act of 1965, under whi ch federal government distributes fund s to state and
local gove rnmental agencies, whi ch in turn lend educationa l ma te rials a nd equipment
to public and private school s, did not violate the Establishment Cla use . The 2007 IDEA
Final Part B Regulations require th a t the public agency r et a ins titl e to property.
equi pment and supplies used to provid e special education a nd r elate d services to
parentally-placed pri vate sch ool s tud en ts and that they onl y be a ppli ed to uses and
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Courts have adhered to Zobrest in holding that providing
special education and related services on-site at sectarian
schools does not violate the Establishment Clause. 114
In 2002, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute against
an Establishment Clause challenge. 115 The statute publicly
funded a school voucher program, in which ninety-six percent
of the student participants from the underperforming
Cleveland public schools chose to attend religious schools. 1·16 An
important reason the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
program was that it provided parents with a wide range of
choices among religious and non-religious schools, including an
after-school tutorial program at students' home schools. 117 The
court viewed this as short-circuiting direct government support
of sectarian schools, since the parents independently chose
where the money went. 1111

pur poses under the Act. 34 C. F.R. § 300.144
11 4. S ec, e.g. , Pe ter v. Wedl , 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998) (one-on-one
pa ra professional services); Helms v. Picard , 151 F. :1d :147 (5th Cir. 1998) (direct
instruction to parochial school stude nt); Ru ssman v. Bel. of Educ .. 150 F'.3d 2 19 (2d Cir.
1998) (consultant teacher servi ces to r eligious school teacher) ; Peck v. Lansing Sch.
Dist ., 148 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. Hl98) (occupational therapy and be ha vi ora l the rapy).
Fur a n interesting case which found an Establishment Clause viol r~tio n, see Americans
United fur Separation of Church a nd State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 4:12 F.
Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (whe re the court held, among other things, that the
sta t e viola ted the excessive e ntangle me nt requirement when it fina nced a pre-t·elease
re ha bili tation program in st a te priso n through a contract with a group tha t, in effect,
set up a n Evangelical Christia n church with compelled participation of inmates
see kin g re ha bilitation).
115. Zelman v. Simmons-Ha rris, 5af; U.S. 639 (2002).
11 6. ld. at 64:1-47 .
117. Td. at 652-54.
11 8. Td. The court al so found t hat no financial incentives e xi ~te d which were
s kewed toward religious ins titution s, since the aid was allocated on th e basis of neutral
secula r criteria. Id. at 653- 654. Th e fa ct that a higher percentage of s tudents selected
sectarian schools was deem ed irreleva nt by the court. Id. at 658 - 69.
Nota bly, in her Zelman concurr e nce Justice O'Connor applied the so-called
"endor se ment test" for de terminin g t he constitutionality of governm ental aid programs,
s uch as the one challenged ther e. !d. a t 668--676. Instead of the Lemon criteria, she
proposed a two-part tes t . Td . Fi rs t , >1 pmgnt m mu st admini ster "aid in a ne utral
fashion, without different ia tion based on the religiou s s tatu s of the be neficiaries or
prov ide rs of the services." ld. Second , the "be neficiaries of indirect a id [t he pa rents]
mu st have a ge nuine choice a mong religious and nonreligious orga ni zations when
determinin g the organiza tion to which they will direct that a id.'' 1d .. To date, a
S u pre me Court majority ha s not a dopted O'Connor's endorsement t est .
In re lia nce on Zelman, the court in L.M by H.M. v. Evesh a m Township Bd. of Educ. ,
256 F. Supp. 2d 290, :iO:i- 05 (D. N.J. 2003), rejected a school di s trict's challenge to a
pa re nt' s tuition reimbursement cla im on Establishment Clau se ground s. concluding
th a t IDEA's reimbursement provi sion s satisfied the no "endorse ment t est" and had a
"sec ul a r legislative purpose." Furthe r it found the reimburse ment was "indirect aid

154

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

In 2006, the United States Department of Education
adopted the long-awaited IDEA/2004 Final Part B Regulations,
which appear to be consistent with IDEA/2004's provisions
concerning privately-placed students and the United States
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The new
regulations make clear that services to parentally-placed
private school children with disabilities may be legally
provided on the premises of private, including religious,
schools. 119 LEAs may not, however, use IDEA/2004 monies to
finance the existing level of instruction in a private school, or to
otherwise benefit the private school. 12 Further, Part B funds
must be expended to meet the special education and related
services needs of parentally-placed private school children with
disabilities, 121 but cannot be used to meet the needs of private
schools or the general needs of students enrolled in private
schools. 122 Finally, LEAs may use IDEA/2004 funds to make
public school personnel available in non-public facilities to the
extent necessary to provide services, 123 so long as those services
are not normally provided by the private school. 124

°

... neutral with respect to religion ... [and] the reimbursement funds reach[ed] sectarian
institutions only as a result of the wholly independent choices of individual parents."
!d.
119. :34 C.F.R § 800.189(a) (2007).
120. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(a) (2006).
121. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(b) (2006).
122. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141(b)(1)(2)(2006).
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.130-144 (2006).
124. 34 C.F.R. § 300.142(a)(b) (2006). Arguably, the 2006 IDEA Part B Regulations
are built on the erroneous assumption that religious schools do not provide special
education and related services to disabled children. What if, for example, a sectarian
school contracts with a private agency to deliver group speech and language therapy
services to three of its students (predicated on a prior arrangement with the children's
parents they would reimburse the sectarian school on a pro-rata basis for its out-ofpocket costs). Whether analyzed under Zobrest , Zelman. or Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement test," no constitutional harm would ensue by the LEA reimbursing the
sectarian school for the speech and language services with IDEA/2004 funds, to the
extent consistent with other IDEA/2004 provisions; paying the service provider
directly, to the extent consistent with other IDEA/2004 provisions; or paying the money
to the parents (through a special education voucher) redeemable by either the service
provider or the sectarian school in an amount consistent with other IDEA/2004
provisions.
The 2006 IDEA Part B Regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 300.144 contain rules for delivery onsite at private schools of property, equipment, and supplies. LEAs may purchase
personal computers for privately placed students where the computer helps the student
overcome disability-related communication difficulties. !d. Computers are similar to
the interpreter in Zobrest, in that their purpose is to assist the child in overcoming his
ability to communicate and not for religious worship, instruction or proselytism, or in
violation of Establishment Clause prohibitions. Of course, the fact that the
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B. Free Exercise Clause Considerations
The Free Exercise Clause does not require a state to fund
all educational programs permitted under the Establishment
Clause. In Locke v. Davey, 125 a non-special-education case, the
Supreme Court dismissed a claim asserting that regulations
promulgated by Washington State violated the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 126 The state regulations
forbade using state scholarship funds to train students for the
ministry, but they permitted using them for training in other
occupational categories. 127 The Supreme Court explained that
the Free Exercise Clause did not reqmre funding all
government programs that are permitted under the
Establishment Clause. 128 It held that the state of Washington
did not, in this case, violate the Free Exercise Clause by
refusing to fund devotional degrees. 129 The Court determined
that the state had a compelling interest to refuse the funding of
theological instruction , even though it funded training for
secular professions; the state's refusal was not based on
religious hostility, but on the permissible purpose of avoiding
religious establishment in violation of state constitutional
reqt~irements . 130
Similar results were obtained in Free Exercise claims based
on unequal treatment under the IDEA.
In Gary S. v.
Manchester School District 131 the First Circuit Court of Appeals

Establishment Clause permits provision of special education and related services on
religious school premises by LEA and SEAs does not ipso facto create an entitlement to
such services. Such rights must be created by state or fed eral statute (consistent with ,
respectively, federal or state constitutions), or by constitutions themselves.
125. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
126. In this case, the Supreme Court r eversed the Ninth Circuit's holding which
fo und the law to be unconstitutional. Locke, 540 U .S. at 715 . The Ninth Circuit had
concluded th at the state had singled out unconstitutionally religion for unfavorable
treatment by its exclusion of theology majors from its scholarship program. Davey v.
Locke, 299 F 3d 748, 757-758 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. Locke, 540 U.S. at 715.
128. Id. at 712.
129. Id . at 725.
130. !d. at 722-25. But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 533-534, (1993) in which the Supreme Court found a Free Exercise
violation where a local ordinance targeted the Santeria religion's rituals and prohibited
animal sacrifices, but not those activities more generally in actual practice. Such laws
must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny: "[they]must be justified by a compelling
government interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest." Id .at
531.
131. 374 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004),
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rejected a Free Exercise claim that private school students are
entitled to receive benefits equal to those of public school
students under IDEA/2004. According to the court, the
plaintiffs were not being deprived of a generally available
public benefit because they exercised their religious
convictions; rather, they made a choice not to accept
IDEA/2004 benefits only available to them in the public
setting. 132 Neither the student's nor the parents' free exercise
of religion were infringed upon by Congress' refusal to fund
sectarian or nonsectarian private schools, and the Court held
that IDEA/2004 did not selectively burden religious conduct. 133
Ultimately, the court observed that "no cognizable burden on
religion has been caused by the federal government's failure to
provide to disabled children attending Catholic schools the
same benefits it provides to disabled public school children." 134
Thus, it is unlikely that parents who sue LEAs or SEAs on the
ground that IDEA's unequal treatment of privately versus
publicly enrolled students unduly burdens their First
Amendment Free Exercise liberty will succeed in their
efforts. 135
IV. TREATMENT OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS
UNDER IDEA/2004: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS SCRUTINY
A. Equal Protection Clause Considerations

Similarly, claims which have asserted a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
based on a different treatment of private and public school
students under the IDEA have been unsuccessful.
LEAs are not required to furnish a FAPE to students
unilaterally placed in private schools. The court in Gary S.
rejected an Equal Protection Claim, in addition to the Free
132. Id. a t 20.
1:33. Id. at 18-22.
134. ld. at 21.
135. ln Anderson v. Town of Durham, 89 A.2d 944, 958- 959 (200G) , cert denied,
127 S.Ct. GGl (2006), a non-special education case, the court appli ed a rational basis
test and held that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated when the St.at.e provided
tuition vouchers to students attending nonsectarian, but not sectarian private schools.
Among other reasons, "excessive entanglemen t'' of state and religion was cons idered an
adequa te justification for withholding tuition vouchers to sectarian schoo ls . /d. at 961.
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Exercise Claim. 136 There, parents asserted that IDEA/2004 had
"infringed upon their fundamental right to direct [their son's]
upbringing and education because it deprives him of a FAPE
and a due process hearing while offering these benefits to
students who receive special education services at public
schools and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny." 137
The court applied a rational basis test to the distinctions made
between students enrolled in public school programs and those
unilaterally placed in private schools. The court concluded
there was no constitutional violation. 138 It held that requiring
LEAs to furnish a FAPE was a heavy burden, and that
Congress acted rationally in deciding not to increase this
responsibly by extending it to students enrolled unilaterally in
private schools. 139

B . Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Considerations
IDEA's discrimination between publicly- and privatelyenrolled pupils does not offend constitutional due process
principles either. In Gary S., the parents also contended that
IDEA/2004 violated their substantive due process rights
because it required them to relinquish their religious beliefs
1 >lfi.

:n 4

F.:id at 17.

137. ld. a t 22.

1:38. !d. a t 22- 2a.
!d. at 2 :~. See also Eulitt ex rel . Eulitt v. Maine De p't of Educ. , :~86 F. ild :H4
(2004). The Eulitt court considered wheth er "the Equal Protection Clause require ld]
Maine to ext end tuition payments to pri vate sectarian secondary school s on behalf of
studen ts who reside in a school district that makes such payments ava ilab le on a
limited basis to private nonsectarian sc hools.'" !d. at 846. 1t held that it does not. ld. In
reliance on Locke, 540 U.S. at 7 12, the court observed that t he Free Exe r·cise Clause
was the primary framework f(Jr assessing religious discrimin a tion claims, and that if
the cha llenged program does no violence to Free Exerci se, no religious discrimination
claim can he stated. Eulitt, :386 F.:3d at :354. Thus, in Eulitt the plaintiff could not
circumvent the Free Exercise Clause by asserting under the Eq ual Protection Clause,
an uncon stitutional burde n on the fundam ental right of religious practice, a nd achieve
a heighte ned level of scrutiny of the government's class ification. ld. Accordingly, the
court applied rational basis s tandards and found they wer e easily satisfied. ld. Those
grounds in clu d<ed conce ntration of th e st ate's limited funds, avoiding religious
entangle ment. and allaying concerns abo ut. state oversight of religious schools'
curricula . /d. at a56. See also Bristol Warren Reg'] Sch. Comm. v. R.I. Dep't of
Elementary a nd Secondary Educ.,25:3 F. Supp. 2d 2:36, 24 :3 (D.lU . 200:3) (th e court held
that t he decision of th e local school dis trict under IDEA/2004 to provide a resource
room progra m to disabl ed s tudents on-s ite at some religious schools (w hich were wit hin
walking di sta nce of public schools), hut not on- site at others (which were farthe r away),
did not vi ola te the Equ a l Protection Clause of Fourtee nth Ame ndment. Th e court
applied the rationale basis test and found that district's "wa lking distance rule" passed
constitution al muster).
1:~9.

158

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

and their right to control their child's education in order to
receive a FAPE and IDEA/2004's procedural protections. 140
Like their other claims, this one was unsuccessful. 141 Here, the
court applied the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine. 142 It
noted that both the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have
"consistently refused to invalidate laws which condition a
parent's ability to obtain educational benefits on the parent's
relinquishment of her right to send her child to private
school." 143 Moreover, the court determined that, in this case,
the parents were not forced to surrender their religious beliefs
or their right to control their child's education in order to
receive IDEA/2004 benefits. 144
V. DECISION MAKING AS TO SPECIAL EDUCATION AND RELATED
SERVICES FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS UNDER IDEA/2004:
THE ISSUE OF ARBITRARINESS AND ADEQUACY OF THE
REMEDIES

In addition to IDEA/2004's failure to create an individual
entitlement to programs and services for parentally-enrolled
private school pupils, to guarantee that programs and services
will correspond to students' needs , and to insure that agreed-to
education will be delivered on-site at the private school the
disabled child attends, IDEA/2004 lacks discernable criteria for
LEA's to apply when making decisions concerning these
children. Moreover, LEAs' virtually unfettered discretion in
assignment of IDEA/2004 benefits with respect to parentallyplaced private school children, coupled with the vagueness of
the statutory remedies for compliance failures , will probably
leave parents with rights in name, but not in fact. 145

140. Ga ry S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F. 3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
141. Id.
142. See I d.
143. Id. The court relied on Norwood v. H arrison, 413 U .S. 455, 462, (1973); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 4 77 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Strout v.
Albanese, 178 F .3d 57, 66 (l. st Cir. 1999) for this proposition . Id. at 23. Relying on
Regan v. Taxation with Represent ation of Wash ., 461 U .S. 540, 549 (1983), t he court
observed that the Supreme Court has held that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize
th e exercise of a fundament al right does not infringe that r ight, and thus is not subject
to strict scrutiny." ld. at 22 .
144. ld. a t 23.
145. Similarly, IDEA/2004 fails to provide sta tes with specific guidance on how to
ensure LEA co mpliance with IDEA's subst a nt ive provisions. See A.A. v. Philips, :386
F .3d 455, 459 (2nd Cir. 2004) (observing th a t whil e a ssigning a general super visory
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Assuming that actionable claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses are
unavailable, 146 claims may exist under state laws which have
established educational entitlements in privately enrolled
disabled students, on the ground that the public agency's
actions were arbitrary or capricious. 147 Thus, a state cause of
action may be available on behalf of these privately enrolled
students to redress program, service, or implementation
failures. Where parents initiate a direct action against an LEA
or SEA, those agencies will very likely interpose the defense
that the parents have failed to exhaust IDEA and/or state
mandated administrative remedies before going to court. 148
Thus, parents will likely end up being relegated to the very
procedures they hoped to avoid.

VI. STATE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS WHICH PROVIDE
BENEFITS TO PARENTALLY-ENROLLED PRIVATE SCHOOL PUPILS
WITH DISABILITIES IN EXCESS OF THOSE PROVIDED UNDER THI<~
IDEA 149
State statutes may require LEAs to provide more generous

role to SEA's over LEA's IDEA/2004 does not set forth the specific requirements of that
role[, except for requiring formulation of policies and procedures] and granting
discretion to the SEA to work with the LEA to ensure compliance with IDEA).
146. Professor Mark Weber of the DePaul University School of Law has suggested
"another thread of due process doctrine" may be available to aggrieved parentallyplaced private school pupils. Mark C. Weber, Services for Private School Students
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory
Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J. L. & EDUC. 163, 20607 (2007). Relying on, among other cases, White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.
1976), he suggested that Due Process requires ascertainable standards which are
"written down and publicly available" in the context of distributing government
benefits like IDEA's. Weber, at 206-207. Since IDEA/2004 sorely lacks meaningful
standards for LEA decision making with respect to parentally-placed private school
pupils, those decisions may be subject to Due Process attack. Notably, this
"transparency in government administration of benefits" requirement does not depend
on the existence of a property or liberty interest for its viability. Id. at 207.
14 7. See Weber, supra note 146.
148. See IDEA § 1415(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2007) (requiring parties to exhaust
their available administrative remedies before filing a civil action).
149. Generally states are prohibited from using Part B funds to provide services to
children who are not included in IDEA's definition of children with disabilities as
defined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8. However, they may use those funds where special
education, related services or supplementary aids and services are "provided to a child
with a disability in a regular class or other education-related setting to a child with a
disability in accordance with the IEP of the child, even if one or more nondisabled
children benefit from these services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.208(a)(1).
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benefits to parentally-placed private school students than
IDEA/2004 in at least four ways. First, state standards of
"appropriateness" may require more than IDEA's "basic floor of
opportunity," as set forth in Rowley. 150 This may result in
students receiving a greater frequency, duration, and/or
intensity of services than under IDEA/2004 itself. Second, state
laws may create an entitlement to a broader range of programs
and services than mandated by the IDEA. Although related to
"appropriateness," such mandates might provide for programs
and services not included in IDEA's definition of special
education and related services-for example, habilitation or
medical services in addition to those for "diagnostic or
evaluation purposes". 151 Third, state laws may require that
programs and services be delivered on-site at a private school
or other locations, whereas IDEA/2004 may not require
provision of location-specific services. Fourth, state laws may
expand the scope of coverage beyond IDEA/2004 for privatelyeducated pupils to include, for example, home-schooled pupils.
Most claims on behalf of students who are parentally-placed in
alternative private settings have asserted entitlements under
more than one of these alternatives.
A. Appropriateness

Where state law standards of appropriateness exceed
IDEA's FAPE m1mmum, those standards may become
enforceable as a matter of federal law under IDEA/2004. 152
This is because IDEA/2004 provides that "the term [FAPE]
means special education and related services that - meet the
standards of the [SEA]. . . " 153
For example, state law

150. 458 U.S. at 200.
151. IDEA/2004 medical services are limited to evaluations. 34 C.F.R. ~§ :100.34(a).
(c)(5).
152. See Gcis v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d 575, 580-81 (:od
Cir. 1985) (commenting that where the federal law incorporates by reference
requirements established by state law, the federal law confers on the federal courts
authority to enforce those standards under their "federal question" jurisdiction); David
D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 615 F. Supp. 2d 639, aff'd 775 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir.
1985) (noting, among other things, that Massachusetts requirement that a child's
services "maximize" his potential was incorporated into IDEA/2004 such that they
become enforceable as a matter of federal law); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918
F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that "even if a school district complies with
federal law, it will still violate the [IDEA] if it fails to satisfy the more extensive state
protections that may also be in place").
153. IDEA/2004 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B) (emphasis added).
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provisions that exceed IDEN2004 mandates may require
programming to meet the child's needs "according to how the
pupils can best achieve success in learning," 154 and to provide
"the fullest possible opportunity to develop their intellectual
capacities. "155 Such provisions have been incorporated into
federal law. 156 In the same vein, federal courts have enforced
state laws that exceed IDEA's minimum by requiring that
educational programs provide "an equal opportunity for each
individual with exceptional needs to achieve his or her full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
pupils." 157 Such state laws have also established procedures for
reconciliation of inconsistent expert opinions beyond those
required by IDEN2004. 158 But state standards that exceed the

154. Geis. 774 F.2d at 582 . In applying New Jersey law, the Geis court affirm ed
t he district court's determination th at required the child's place ment to continue at the
private residential school preferred by the parents r ather than the public placement
recommended by the school district. ld. at 583. In Bd. of Educ.of E.Windsor Reg'!
Sch.Dist.v. Diamond , 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit again appli ed
the "how the student can best achieve success in learning" standard , operative at the
time the services were r endered a nd on the da te of r eview by the New J ersey
Depart ment of Education, and concluded the parents' placement of their sever ely
disabled child in a residential facility was appropriate under New Jersey law, and
ordered reimbursement to the parents for the costs incurred in making the placement.
But see Ewing Twn. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S.V. , 1991 WL 186691 (D. N .•J. 1991). There. the
cou rt rejected the parents' argument that a higher standard applied and concluded the
Rowley standard was applicable. This was based on New J ersey regulations issued in
1989 rej ecting any notion that New J ersey's standards for appropriateness exceeded
Rowley's. ld. at *5.
155. Geis, 774 F.2d at 582 (emphasis in original). In Burke County Bd. of Educ.v.
Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982- 983 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit, observing that the
policy of t he state was to "ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to r each his full
potential ," recognized that North Carolina "r equir es a level of substantive benefit
great er than that required under federal law." The court nevertheless denied the
parents' request for habilita tion services in the child's home. Id. It reasoned that, even
under North Carolina's more generous provisions (as compared to fed eral education
law), habilitative services did not fall within the ambit of state special educa tion
manda tes . Id. at 984.
156. Geis, 774 F.2d at 581(observing that "incorporation of state standards is
exp licit in the Act.'').
l57. Pink v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch .Dist., 738 F. Supp. :345. 346- :347 (N.D. Calif.
1990).
158. See Seattl e Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S. , 82 F.~3d 149::!, 1499 n.2 (!:Jth Cir. 19~J6)
(where the court found the di strict violated Wa shington law). But see Soraruf v.
Pinckey Cmty. Schools, 208 F.3d 315 (Table), 2000 WL 245501 (6th Cir. 2000). In a n
unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit rej ected the parents' contention that a Michigan
statute. which r equired school hoards to "provide special education progra ms and
services designed to develop the maximum potential of each handic a pped person,"
imposed a n appropriateness standard higher than Rowley 's. The Soraru( court deferred
to the SEA's interpretation of the quoted language and concluded that it was in essence
precatory. id. a t :3, requiring only that the program "was r eason a bly calculated to
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standards set forth in IDEA/2004 will not be enforceable if they
conflict with other IDEA/2004 provisions. 159 Notably, there are
a number of cases where parents have failed to establish that
state standards exceeded those of the IDEA. 160
provide [the student] with educational benefits." ld. The Sixth Circuit in Renner v. Bd.
of Educ. of the Pub. Sch. of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (1999) , applying the same statute,
also rej ected the parents' claim. However, the Renner court stated: "Under the higher
Michigan standards U defendants proposed an adequate and sufficient plan to provide
[the student] a free appropriate public education offering to meet and develop the
'maximum potential' of this child in light of his abilities and needs" (emphasis added) .
l d . at 646. According to the court "maximum potential" does not require a "model"
ed ucation . ld. at 645. In light of the apparently conflicting language (applying a n
amorphous higher standa rd and later reverting to Rowley standards) it is unclear how
to apply the Michi gan law.
In Doe v. Tullahoma City Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 511 U.S. 1108 (1994) the court, applying
Tennessee law, rejected the parents' claim that the state's appropriateness standards
exceeded Rowley's. The statute at issue(, Tenn. Code Ann. Section 49-10-101 (a)(1) ,]
stated: "It is the policy of this state to provide, and to require school districts to
provide, as an integral part of free public education, special education services
sufficien t to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children"
(emphasis added). The Court based its decision on the fact that: the Tennessee law predated the original 1975 version of the IDEA, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, P.L. 94-142, thereby makin g it impossible to infer that the legislature
inte nded to exceed fed eral requirements. The Tennessee state courts had not
interpreted the law to require more than what IDEN2004 requires, and "there was no
hard evidence to indicate that th e Tennessee legislature intended anything more than
to rem edy the past inadequacies of educational opportunities for the handi ca pped." /d.
at 458.
159. See 34 C.F.R. § ;{00.17(b) (2006). See also Amann v. Stow Sch. System, 982
F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1992) (notwithstanding sta te's maximizin g standard, the appropria te
place ment for a learnin g disabled pupil was in a public sc hool rather than a pri vate
school program exclusively for learning disabled pupils, in light of IDEA's least
restrictive environment requirements) .
160. See, e.g. , Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 199 F.3d 1116, 1122 (lOth Cir.
1999) (t·ecognir,ing that if New Mexico regulations respecting "stay-pu t" righ ts exceeded
the fed eral standard they would be enforceable under IDEN2004, if they are not
inconsi ste nt with IDEA/2004, but finding that New Mexico law did not exceed IDEA's
requirf~ments in tha t case); O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Schs. Unified Sch. Dist., 144 F.:3d
692, 701 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that Kansas law does not exceed Rowley standard of
appropriateness); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1029- 1030 (lOth
Cir. 1990) (concluding Oklahoma does not provide for a heightened sta ndard). In t he
same vein, a United States District Court in Florida recently rul ed that the Florida
co nstitution did not create a standa rd which exceeded Rowley's for an appropriatf•
education for children with disabilities. Sch. Bd. of Lee County v. M. M. , 2007 WL
98:3274 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
Where state standards exceed IDEA's minimum, t hey arguably create a liberty or
property interest protected by the Proced ural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State laws may do this explicitly. or by creating an expectation that gives
rise to a vested right. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 69:1 (1976): !3d. of Regents v.
Roth , 408 U.S. fi64 (1972) (state law defines the existence of property and liberty for
the purposes of procedura l due process).
flor an in terest in g discussion concerning sta te standards and IDEA/2004, see Gary L.
Monscrud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children wit h
Disabilities, 18 ST. ,JOHN'S .J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675 (2004).
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B. Individual Entitlements and On-Site Services under State
Law
With respect to privately enrolled students with disabilities,
two principal state law questions arise: (1) does the student
enjoy an individual entitlement to services? And, (2) if so, must
they be provided on the site of the private school? Since courts
have tended to treat them together, these issues will be treated
together in this article.
In John T. v. Marion Independent School District, the court
determined that Iowa law requires an LEA to provide the
services of a full-time communications assistant to a student
attending a private religious school. 161 Applying New York law,
the Bay Shore Union Free School District v. T. court ordered an
LEA to furnish a one-to-one aide to a "health impaired" student
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder on the premises of
a private sectarian school. 162 In Fowler v. Unified School
District, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, under Kansas law,
enforceable under IDEA/2004, a deaf child enjoyed an
individual entitlement in excess of IDEA/2004 obligations to
the on-site services of a sign language interpreter in a private
non-sectarian school, to the extent that its cost did not exceed
the average cost of providing hearing impaired students the

161. 17:1 F.:'ld 684 (8th Cir. 1999). In John. 1'., the parties agreed that the student
r equired a full -tim e communications assistant in order to function in a classroom
environment. l d. at 6H7. This service was included in th<; student's IEP. Id . The LEA
r efused to provide the service at the religiou s school upon the parents' r equest,
cla iming that its obligation did not extend to furnishing the assistance on the private
school premises . ld. at 6HG-H7. The Iowa statute stated th a t school uistricts "s hall
make public school services ... available to children attending nonpuhlic schools in the
sa me mann e r and to the sam e extent that they are provided to public school stude nts."
I OWA C OD E § ~56 .1 2(2 ). The court denied the parents an attorneys' fe e award on the
g round they prevailed under state law a nd not [DI~A. John. T. , 17:! F.:~d at 689 - 90. ln
his di !;sen t on this point, ,Judge Cibson argued the majority improperl y characterized
th e parents' prl'Va ilin~ claim as exclus ively s tate based. ld. at G !H-9 :~ . He reaso ned
that sta te law standa rd s that impose a greater duty than IDEA/2004 to educate
ha ndica pped childre n are enforceable under fDEN2004, if those standards are not, as
in this case, inconsistent with federal law. l d. l n ligh t of eases lik e David D. v.
Da rtmouth Sch. Comm., (j J5 F. Supp. 2d !1:19 (1st Cir. 1985) (not cited by the disse nt) ,
th e di ssent argua bly ~ot the better of th e argument..
162. Bay Shore, 405 F. Supp. 2d at ~50. Inte rpreting New York's Dual Enrollment
statute. th e court. sa id: " [n a ease s uch as th is one, whe re a child requiring special
education se rvices is atte nding an appropriate priva te school fo r his core ele mentary
education , a nd a requisi te service can he effective only in that. private school, under
Ne w York Law the school district must deliver th e service on th e pre mi ses of the
private school." Td.
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same service in the public schools. 163 In John T. v. Delaware
County Intermediate Unit, 164 the court applied Pennsylvania
law as incorporated into IDEA/2004, concluding that the LEA
was obligated to supply speech therapy, occupational therapy,
a classroom aide and an itinerant teacher on-site at a Catholic
school at levels reasonably calculated to afford the pupil
educational progress for secular subjects only. 165 One
Pennsylvania Court, construing its own laws, found that they
contained require ments in excess of IDEA's requirements for
parentally-placed student with disabilities. 166 Notwithstanding
these results, states have tended to mirror IDEA/2004 in
limiting parentally-enrolled private school students' individual
right to on-site services. 167

163. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist., 128 F. :)d 1431, 1439 (1997). In 199 ~) , Kansas
a mended this statute. See K<\N. STAT. ANN. § 72-5393 (as ame nd ed by L. 1999, ch . 116.
~ 40) . It now provides that th e district of res idence determines the s ite of service
delivtery afte r consul t in g with th e parents. l d. This represents a ret reat from t he pri or
la w which created an e ntitlement t.o on-site services a t the private school selected by
the parents. Id. at 14:38 (citing KAN. STATE. ANN. ~ 72-5:39:-l). Notab ly, th e new law
ma nda tes provision of services to pri va te school enro ll ees based on the d istri ct of
residence, not location lik e IDEA/2004. See 20 U.S.C. § 14 12(a)(l0)(A)(i); Memorandum
to Chief State 8ch. Officers, 4:-l IND. WITH DISABILITIES EllUC. L. Rr-:1'. 224 (OSEP 2005)
Thus, Kan sas mandates services in ex cess of the IDEN2004 minimum in thi s r es pect.
164. ,John T .v. De l. County In terme diate Unit, 2000 WL 558582 (.KD. Pa . 2000).
165. l d . at9-10.
166. 8 ee Veschi v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist. , 772 A.2d 469, 475 (Pa. Co mmw. Ct . 2001)
(the court determined that an TOEA -eligibl e s tudent was entitled to receive speech
services in hi K local district while still attending his parochial school. The pr inciple
statute applied, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §fi-502. provided in pe rt inen t part: '' No pupil s hall
he refused a dmission t.o the cou rses in th ese a ddition a l schools or departme nts. by
reaso n of th e fact th at his elemen ta ry or academic educa tion is being or has !wen
rec:eived in a school other t han a p ublic school."); see ulso Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 931 A.2d 640 (2007) (a non -IDEA case). Th e Supre me Court of Penn sylva nia h eld
that a school d is trict was required to provide occ upation a l t herapy services pursuant. to
the Rehabilita tion Act , § 504, to a n otherwise eligible §504 studen t. who was enrolled
fu ll time in a private school kindergar ten program. The court interprete d the
P e nn sylvani a Code in relation to § 504 a nd co nstitutional Su pre macy Clause
princ iples. Jd. lt firml y rejected t he di strict's argument that the studen t's right to
services hin ge d on hi s tu king courses in the public schoo l setting. !d. It stated that"§
504's mand ates apply to all potentia ll y eligib le students based on t heir res id ency , not
thei >' school of attendance; as long as Doe is in the District's jmisdiction , the Dis trict
has to provide what § 504 mandates." Jd. at 5. Thus, where LE As refuse to s uppl y
programs an d services to privately educa t ed specia l education students under
lDEA/2004 or state law , section 504 may he a source of rights not oth erwise avai lable
under those statutes.
167. ,Judge ,Jack Weinstein observed that the "widespread practice [among sta tes!
is to permit, but. not require, schoo l districts to provide services to student s in private
sc hools." Ray Shore, 40ii F. Supp. 2d a t 249. Hfl found this "unsurpri s ing'' in li gh t of the
fact th at "most state programs, are patterned ex plicitly on t he fe dera l stat ute !. citing to
Ca lifornia. Pennsylvania , a nd Texas enactme nts ,] and regulations !, citin g to Virgin ia's
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C. Home-Schooled Students
Services to home-schooled students are not required by
IDEA/2004, but states may grant the students additional
protection. Since IDEA/2004 delegates responsibility to the
states to determine whether home-schooled students are to be
considered "private school" pupils, such students may obtain
even fewer IDEA/2004 benefits than the already attenuated
ones enjoyed by parentally-enrolled private school students.
The leading case addressing this issue is Hooks v. Clarl'l County
School Di~trict. 16R The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the
parents' claim for reimbursement for speech therapy services
that the parents had obtained for their home-schooled child,
because a "home school" was not included within the definition
of a "private school" under Nevada law at that time. 169
Although Hooks bars claims for IDEA-based services for
home-schooled pupils where state law does not treat them as
"private school" students, state law may nevertheless afford
greater protection for home-schooled students. In Forstrom v.
Byrne, 170 for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, held that a home-schooled child's right to
equal protection under the New Jersey constitution was
violated when an LEA refused to provide speech and language
services to him, the school had invited nonpublic school
children to participate in the services, and the student was
willing to go to the public school to receive those services. 171

VII. RESTRICTlVE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION CLAUSES
AND STATUTES, THEIR IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS
WHO ATTEND SECTARIAN SCHOOLS AND THE INVOCATION OF
IDEA/2004 BY-PASS PROCEDURES
While Zobrest:c; sign language interpreter and Zelman's
and Arizona 's imple menting- regulations]." Jd.
1G8. 228 F.:·;d 10:'!6 (9th Cir. 2000).
169. ld. After commencement of the Hooks case, the Nevada legislature amended
its statute to require ·'each sc hool district [to] provide programs of special education
and related services for children who are exempt from compulsory attendance pursuant
to the home-education exemptio n and receive instructio n at home". Hooks at 1039
(quoting Nev. Act. Chap. GOo, Sec. 45(1999), codified at NEV. REV. STAT. §392.070(2)
(2000)).

170. 775 A.2d 65 (200 1).
171. !d. at 74-78. The New Jersey constitu t ion did not contai n a n express equal

protection clau se but it has been read into its text. !d. at

75~77.
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vouchers may be permissible as a matter of federal
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, they might offend State
constitutional anti -establishment provisions. 172 After all,
principles of federalism may reqmre deference to more
restrictive state constitutions.
Since state actors may be forbidden from engaging in
Zobres t- or Zelman-type activities under state constitutional
law, IDEA/2004 provides for so-called by-pass procedures.
These procedures allow the United State Secretary of
Education, upon complying with mandated procedures, to
withhold federal funds from the LEA and apply them directly
for the benefit of disabled students. 173 This avoids federal-state
conflicts, while enabling students to receive the benefits they
would have received, absent such conflicts, under IDEA's
proportionality provisions. Where a by-pass is invoked, states
may obtain a review of the Department of Education's
decision. 174

172. See, e.g . KERN ALEXA NDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMimiCA N PUI3LIC
SCHOOL LAW. 201-07 (6th Ed. 2005) (considering state supreme court decisions
interpreting anti-e stabli sh ment provisions in state constitutions in Al aska, Colorado,
Ha waii. Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky , Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ne w Hampshire,
Oregon , Wa shington and Wyoming, and concluding with respect to a id provisions
affecting private schools that these States have more r estrictive church-state
separation requirements than the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution).
173. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(A). These involve "dividing the total amount received
by t he State under Part B of the Act for the fiscal year by the number of children with
disabil ities served in the prior year as reported to the Secretary ... by ... [t)he number of
private school children with dis abilities . .. in the State, LEA or other pu blic agency, as
determined by the Secretary on the basis of t he most recent satisfactory data available,
which may include an estimate of the number of those children with disabilities," 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.1 90-198(2006), and deducti ng thi s amount from the total monies paid to
the state, :14 C.F.R. § ::100.191(2006).
174. A state may obtain further review in the United States Comt of Appeals for
the Circuit wh ere the state is situated. 20 U.S.C . § 1412(f)( 3)(B). Although there is
little reported lit igation involving IDEA/2004 by-pass procedures, the court in Foley v.
Special Sch. Ois t .of St. Louis County, 153 F .3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 199R) 1·ecognized that
where the Missouri state constitution forb ade public school educators from r endering
services on private school premises, JDEA/2004 by- pass could be applied for the
students' benefit. It obse rved that by-pass "was an adequate and less intrusive 1·emedy"
when state law frustrated delivery of IDEA/2004 services. I d.
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VIII.RECTIFYING INEQUITIES IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
FOR DISABLED STUDENTS WHO ARE ENROLLED IN PRIVATE,
INCLUDING SECTARIAN, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS

Those who support treating parentally-enrolled disabled
children equitably, as compared to publicly-enrolled pupils,
might consider lobbying Congress for appropriate amendments
to IDEAJ2004. Broadly speaking, supporters could demand
comparability of programs and services to those provided by
LEAs and SEAs to publicly enrolled students. In most cases,
this would require LEAs and SEAs to satisfy IDEA's
appropriateness standards (albeit in a private setting), or more
demanding state requirements, where applicable, for
parentally-enrolled private school children. To be effective,
such legislation would have to be carefully drafted to ensure
that states received the "clear notice" mandated by the
Spending Clause, especially in the wake of current "unfunded
mandates" litigation. 175 Such careful drafting would include,
for example, the express incorporation into IDEAJ2004 of state
standards which exceed IDEA's standards.
In fairness to LEAs and SEAs, the cost of comparable
programs and services should not exceed those incurred by
public agencies for identical programs or services. This would
require the development of appropriate formulae to determine
the costs of such activities when rendered by the public agency.
For purposes of consistency in implementation, these formulae
should be developed by the United States Department of
Education and not delegated to the states.
In the same vein, Congress should amend the Act to provide
for the uniform treatment of home-schooled pupils. Since the
current IDEAJ2004 allows states to furnish home-schooled
pupils with fewer services than other privately educated
students, their rights should be made comparable to other
privately-educated disabled students under the proposed
amendments. Wh en providing comparable services would cost
more than providing services for a publicly-enrolled student,
LEAs and SEAs would retain the right to refuse to support
those costs. That would be the price paid by the child for his
parents' choice. This should not occur frequently, and where it

17;). Sec, e.{;. , City of Pontiac, 512 F.3d at 267.
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does, the reduction in most cases would be de minimus.
IDEA/2004 should be amended to provide parentallyenrolled private school students with an individual entitlement
to the comparable programs and services described above.
These would be based on the LEA's recommended IEP. There is
no sound reason to have IEPs for publicly-enrolled pupils, but
"service plans" for parentally-placed private school pupils.
These differences invite public agencies to exercise diminished
care to the special needs children who are privately enrolled.
Arguably, it suggests disrespect for such permissible parental
choices. Since LEAs would not be obligated to fund the nonspecial-education portion of the parentally-placed child's
program, and cost ceilings of the kind mentioned above for
special services could easily be incorporated into the Act, the
special needs of unserved children would be met and fairly
balanced against the costs incurred by public agencies.
The amendments to IDEA/2004 relative to parentallyplaced private school pupils should include procedural parity as
well. Where the public agencies fail to implement an agreed-toprogram, for example, privately-enrolled children should be
protected through due process procedures identical to those
protecting publicly-enrolled students. IDEA/2004's state
complaint procedures for implementation and other failures
provide a remedy in name, but not in substance, for parentallyenrolled private school pupils. Without possessing the teeth of
individually enforceable orders, the remedies contained in
IDEA/2004 for privately-placed children are largely illusory.
The coupling of substantive and procedural rights comparable
to publicly-enrolled students would serve as a check on
arbitrary decision-making by public agencies and encourage
more thoughtful consideration by public agencies of individual
students' needs.
Where states could not comply with the proposed revisions
due to state constitutional a nti-establishment or other
obstacles, 176 they would be obligated to give notice to the
176. lD EN2004 recognizes three circumsta nces which wi ll trigger intervention by
the Secreta ry through use of its by· pass procedures for parentall y placed private school
children wit h disabilities. Thf'se are the Secretary's determination that (1) state law
prohibits providing equitab le services in private schools, (2) that the school district or
state educational agency have substantially failed to provide equitable services in
private sc hools, or (::l) th at the school distri ct or SEA is unwilling to provide equitable
services in private school s. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(1); 70 Fed. Reg. 35856 (200R): :-!4 C.F.R.
§ 190(a) (2007).
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USDOE of their inability or unwillingness to comply with the
law's requirements. The USDOE would then be required to
invoke IDEA/2004's by-pass procedures to ensure that
privately-enrolled disabled children would be protected and
receive benefits directly from the United States, comparable to
the benefits given to disabled students enrolled in public
schools. 177 To support the comparable programs and services,
the USDOE could deduct monies from IDEA/2004 allotments
proportional to the number of children who would be unserved
due to the state's unwillingness or inability to comply with the
law's requirements 178 and, where needed, from other federally
funded educational programs. 179 The amended IDEA/2004
would provide for a direct, private right of action to enforce the
amended statute against the state recipients of IDEA/2004
monies, including class action relief, and extend to prevailing
parent plaintiffs the same rights as enjoyed by parents of
publicly-enrolled children for the recovery of attorneys' fees and
statutory costs. Of course, all these provisions would be made
express, unequivocal and consistent with the Spending Clause
notice requirements.
Since such provisions might be difficult to achieve in
Congress, advocates for parentally-placed, privately-enrolled
children should focus their efforts in state legislatures, as well.
177. 1DEN2004 provides that whe re the Secretary invokes the law's by-pass
procedures he s hall "arrange for the provision or services to sueh children." 20 U.S.C. §
1412(!)(1); 70 Fed. Reg. 35856 (2005); :14 C. F.R. § 300.190(a).
178. Under current law, if th e Sec retary is required to provide equitable services
for privately-enrolled pupils under the by-pass procedures, payme nt for those services
must be made by the U.S. Departme nt of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(f)(2)(A); 70 Fed.
Reg. :-15856 (2005): :34 C.F.R. § 300.19l(b)-(c) . The amount of payments to the
provider(s) of such services sha ll he determined, after consultatio n with private and
public school officials, to be a n amou nt per child that does not exceed the amount
establis hed by the established formula. !d. The formula amount is determined by
dividing the "total amount received by the State for the fiscal year'' by the "number of
children with disabilities served in the prior year." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)(2)(A)(i)-(ii); 70
Feel. Reg. 35856 ,:35885 & 35889 (2005) ; .'34 C. F.R. §§ 300.706, § 811 (2007).
179. Such programs could include the aforementioned "No Child Left Be hind Act of
2001," 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 , for exa mple. Given their natural resistance to
"unfunded mandates," some states would undoubtedly r esist e ncroac hment on federal
funding beyond that provided by IDEA. However, the conditioning t he receipt of federal
money on compliance with Co ng ress' determination of what the Ge neral Welfare
requires is firmly established in t hi s country . See City of Pontiac, 5 12 F.3d at 261
(explaining, in part, the evolution of federal aid programs to public schools). Moreover,
"the overwhelming burden of [educational] funding in this country is and has always
been borne by State and local governments." !d. at 277 (emphasis added). Even with
NCLB, the federal government provides only seven percent of the total funding for local
education. !d.
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They might consider, for example, lobbying for legislation
which ensures that parentally-placed private school children
with disabilities enjoy (1) an individual entitlement to all
programs and services based on their IEP, (2) comparability of
funding supporting services received by students enrolled in
public school programs, and (3) access to qualified personnel of
the same kind as publicly-enrolled students. Where state
statutes contain ambiguities concerning whether they exceed
IDEA/2004 minimums, advocates for privately educated
students could propose language which expressly states that
the law is intended to exceed IDEA's floor of opportunity and
the Rowley minimum, and delineate in what way.
IX. CONCLUSION
The inequitable treatment received by parentally-enrolled
private school children under IDEA/2004 defeats the stated
purpose of ID EA/2004 itself: to provide all disabled children
with an appropriate education. The administrative effort to
serve such children equitably is more than amply justified by
the educational benefits the children would receive if Congress
had enacted comparability legislation of the kind suggested
above. Since this proposal caps the cost to public agencies, so
that they would not be required to spend more money than
they would if these children were publicly-enrolled, there
should be few objections to the proposal on financial grounds.
Since privately-educated pupils' parents bear the cost of tuition
for the student's general education, public agencies are relieved
from that cost. Thus, there is a financial incentive for public
agencies to render comparable special programs and services to
parentally-placed private school children with disabilities and
avoid the student's return to the public school.
Since Congress failed to address the concerns raised in this
article in IDEA/2004, advocates for parentally-enrolled private
school students with disabilities should consider lobbying at
the state level in tandem with their Congressional efforts. In
most respects, efforts at the state level should mirror those at
the federal level. State legislative enactments should, however,
avoid ambiguities which appear in some laws previously passed
and later became the subject of the litigation reviewed in this
article. In particular, such laws should articulate in what ways
they exceed IDEA/2004 protections with respect to, for
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example,
individual
entitlements,
standards
of
appropriateness, kinds of programs and services available to
students, as well as the remedies for program and service
compliance failures and the procedures for vindicating such
rights.
Parents of privately-educated disabled students who hope
to obtain substantially equal educational benefits for their
children under IDEA/2004, as compared to publicly-enrolled
students, are unlikely to find the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as sources of such
rights. Although the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment permits Congress under IDEA/2004 to confer
educational benefits on a comparable basis to privatelyenrolled pupils who attend sectarian schools, Congress is not
required to and has chosen not to do so. Furthermore, under
current constitutional interpretation, Congress's decision does
not run afoul of their First Amendment Free Exercise rights,
notwithstanding some parental contentions to the contrary.
Thus, the Supreme Court has respected states' sovereignty
where their anti-Establishment provisions forbade assistance
to religious schools, or they exercised their sovereign powers in
an otherwise rational manner.
The legislative initiatives suggested above do not disrupt
the delicate balance of power between the federal and state
governments set out in our constitutional scheme. Instead, they
provide an opportunity for Congress to pick up the gauntlet of
reform in a manner consistent with the requirements of the
Spending Clause, while showing appropriate respect for state
sovereignty. Moreover, the reforms suggested at the state level
may be undertaken independently so as to afford each
jurisdiction the opportunity to exercise their traditional control
over educational policy and to select the alternatives which
meet the special needs of the students they serve. Although
Congress and most states have decided to discriminate in the
provision of special education and related services between
parentally-placed private school pupils with disabilities and
disabled children who are publicly-enrolled, it is within the
entities' power to do so. The contention of this article is that
they have made a bad choice.
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